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This paper investigates the impact of previous losses incurred by U.S serial 
bidders on their M&A strategic choices and premiums paid to acquire targets. The Hubris 
and Overconfidence theories suggest that managers tend to overpay as a result of 
exaggerating their ability to extract value and manage post-acquisition integration process 
between the acquiring firm and its target. Managerial overconfidence, which is signaled 
by conducting several acquisitions within a short time period or by other manager-
specific investment attributes, has been shown to contribute to increasing premiums in 
M&A transactions and subsequent poor post-acquisition performance. 
Experimental findings in the area of psychology over the past three decades 
introduced the notion that economic agents experience utility resulting from changes in 
wealth (gains and losses) relative to a reference point rather than the level of total wealth 
and that losses loom larger than gains. The Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
suggests that decision makers tend to be more aggressive (risk taking) after a loss in order 
to recover their losses and more risk averse after gains. The Quasi-Hedonic hypothesis 
(Thaler & Johnson, 1990) indicates that decision makers will become more risk taking 
after repeated gains {"House Money Effect") but tend to be more risk averse after losses 
to avoid further pain. However, decision makers tend to be more risk taking after losses if 
there is a chance for breaking even. 
Using a sample of 16,582 M&A transactions by 3,512 U.S public bidders 
involved in at least two acquisition attempts over the 1990-2005 period, this study 
introduces several loss proxies based on corporate, market, industry and managerial 
compensation factors. Several empirical tests are conducted in this study to control for 
concurrent decisions taken by managers, endogeneity effects in explaining premiums, 
alternate model specifications, industry factors, time period effects as well as robustness 
for managerial overconfidence and entrenchment. The results are consistent across all 
sub-periods, however, the significance of M&A success history variables diminish over 
the 2001-2005 period. 
I present evidence that bidders suffering from earlier losses in terms of market, 
industry and compensation factors tend to be more aggressive in their target choices (i.e. 
choosing private and/or unrelated targets) and tend to overpay. Corporate loss 
events/shocks, such as failure to conclude an earlier merger deal, tend to motivate 
managers to make safer bets in terms of choosing public targets operating in related 
industries, however, still tend to overpay for targets. As the level of stock ownership of 
the bidder's management/executive team increases, managers tend to respond to 
corporate failure events/shocks in a similar fashion as other loss proxies. The results 
presented are generally robust to overconfidence, insider ownership, sub-periods and 
industry wide factors. The results are also robust to the compensation structure of the 
management team and target-bidder relative size. 
In addition, the results presented in this study support the agency theory 
implications in regards to the bidder's target choices (i.e. related/unrelated and 
private/public targets) and the market-driven/mispricing theory in regards to partially 
explaining premiums paid by bidders to acquire their prospective targets. 
The results presented provide support to the prospect theory propositions that 
losses experienced by economic agents induce an aggressive or risk taking behavior in 
subsequent bets by pursuing non-public and/or unrelated targets and offering higher 
premiums. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The prospect theory stresses that decision makers are influenced by the utility 
experienced as a result of changes in wealth relative to a reference point rather than the 
level of total wealth. Losses are almost twice as painful as gains and choices/gambles are 
affected by the prospect of gain and loss as well as how they are framed. Mental 
accounting and narrow framing suggest that decision makers tend to segregate events and 
create mental accounts for gains and losses, thus making myopic decisions not based on 
the level of overall wealth as suggested earlier by consumption based utility theories. 
Several hypotheses supported by experimental evidence adopting changes in 
wealth relative to a reference point as a carrier of utility have been raised in the area of 
psychology describing the likely reaction of economic agents to gains and losses in their 
subsequent gambles. First, the Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests 
that decision makers tend to be more aggressive (risk taking) after a loss in order to 
recover their losses and become more risk averse after gains to protect these gains. 
Second, the Quasi-Hedonic Hypothesis (Thaler & Johnson, 1990) which was developed 
depending on experimental evidence about choices in repeated gambles suggest that 
decision makers will be more risk taking after repeated gains (House Money Effect) but 
tend to be more risk averse after losses to avoid further pain. Nevertheless, decision 
makers tend to be more risk taking after losses if there is a chance for breakeven. Other 
behavioral theories provide different (complimentary or contradicting) assertions. The 
hubris (Roll, 1986) and overconfidence theories (Malmendier & Tate, 2005a) suggest that 
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decision makers exaggerate their managerial skills and abilities (ego), hence making 
wrong aggressive decisions. This phenomenon is generally expected to increase after 
gains/achievements, thus managers are expected to be more aggressive after gains. In 
addition, the Agency theory (Jensen, 1986) points out that managers tend to engage in 
empire building and organizational diversification to hedge their human capital 
investment. Accordingly, managers may resort to less risky choices than optimal from the 
perspective of stockholders. Further, the Organizational Learning theory (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002) introduced in the strategic management research area 
highlights the role of increasing acquisition experience in mitigating the risks of making 
bad acquisition choices and decisions and thus is associated with better performance. 
The research agenda of the current study is to examine the effect of historical 
losses and gains on the risk-attitude of managers executing subsequent M&A 
transactions. This paper provides an empirical testing of the contradicting predictions 
suggested by the prospect theory and the quasi-hedonic hypothesis in the context of 
M&A transactions. The empirical results of this study should shed light on the risk-
attitude of management post losses and the manner in which this attitude affects their 
M&A decisions including the choice between related/unrelated targets, local/foreign 
targets, public/non-Public targets, relative size of target, and premiums paid by bidders. 
Results are driven from a sample of M&A completed and uncompleted deals by public 
U.S bidders attempting 2 or more acquisitions during the 1990-2005 time period. 
The current study makes a novel and significant contribution by introducing and 
empirically testing prospect theory driven propositions in the area of mergers and 




2.1 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
The area of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) attracted high level of research 
attention over the past 3 decades. The neoclassical economic theory suggests that mergers 
and acquisitions are considered to be corporate reorganization transactions that improve 
firm's efficiency and resource allocation/utilization. However, theories following a 
behavioral view of financial markets and economic agents suggest that other market 
inefficiencies may partially explain, at least, the phenomenon of M&A transactions 
particularly when neoclassical based theories fail to explain such transactions. Early 
attempts to explain and theorize the motives behind M&A deals included agency, hubris 
and synergy theories, where in the later bidders were assumed to pursue different forms 
of organizational synergy resulting in a combined value of the firm post merger 
exceeding the sum of the pre-merger stand-alone values of the bidder and target 
(Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). Some studies attempted to examine merger 
announcement returns in order to infer the stand-alone values of the bidder and the target 
as well as the resulting synergies from the market's perspective (Hietala, Kaplan, & 
Robinson, 2003). Nevertheless, empirical evidence pointed out that while some bidders 
do create value, many acquisition transactions result in losses incurred by bidders. 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) highlighted the large scale of value 
destroyed in M&A transactions during the latest merger wave during the 1998-2001 
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period. During this time period, few large-scale transactions resulted in $240 billion in 
losses to bidders (12% of deals value) while earlier waves resulted in $7 billion losses 
only (1.6% of deals value). Further, firms conducting these deals performed poorly 
afterwards for an extended time frame and are generally serial acquirers. Interestingly, 
excluding the extreme loss transactions from the sample, the study found that bidders on 
average achieved modest positive returns. The study points out that the reported 
empirical evidence is consistent with Jensen's (2004) hypothesis that high valuations 
increase managerial discretion which increases the possibility of managers tendency to 
make poor acquisitions when they have run out of good ones. 
2.1.1 Motives of Mergers and Acquisitions 
Several theories were advanced to explain mergers and acquisitions activity, 
management motives behind making such transactions, and the perceived performance 
of bidders and targets post acquisition. First, the Hubris and overconfidence theories, 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2005a; Roll, 1986), suggest that managers suffering from hubris 
tend to overpay for their targets. Second, the agency theory (Jensen, 1986) suggests that 
managers initiate such transactions as a form of empire building behavior that enhances 
their personal flexibility and gains rather than maximizing shareholder's wealth. Third, 
the equity signaling theory, (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Travlos, 1987), suggests that firms 
paying for targets using equity send a signal to the market that their assets in place are 
likely to be overvalued. Forth, the overvaluation and market-driven acquisitions theories 
(Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003) point out that 
bidders with overvalued stock are motivated to conduct such deals using their overvalued 
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currency. High volume of M&A transactions is explained at least partially by the 
overvaluation of bidders' stock and the dispersion of valuation across bidders and targets. 
Fifth, the growth opportunities signaling theory (McCardle & Viswanathan, 1994) 
suggests that firms resorting to acquisitions as an investment strategy send a signal to the 
market that the bidder exhausted its internal growth opportunities. 
Several behavioral theories, which assume one form or another of irrationality in 
markets and/or economic agents, have offered alternative explanations to M&A 
transactions related issues and empirical findings. Two main theories in this area have 
received more attention in recent financial research, hubris/overconfidence and 
mispricing, which are discussed further below. Roll (1986) introduced the Hubris theory 
to explain part of the observed regularities in corporate takeover transactions. 
Accordingly, managers' excessive self-confidence and overbearing pride can lead them 
to consistently make mistakes in selecting the appropriate targets as well as determining 
the price to be offered to consummate the takeover reflecting the underlying fundamental 
value of the target firm. The key element in this consistent bias is the valuation of an 
asset that has an observable price determined by market participants in case of public 
targets in particular. Roll argues that takeover gains may have been overestimated if they 
exist at all. 
The mechanism by which takeover attempts are initiated and consummated 
suggests that at least part of the sizable price increases experienced by the shareholders of 
target firms may represent a simple value transfer from the bidding firm rather than 
potential synergies. In other words, the observed takeover premium overstates the 
increase in economic value of the corporate combination. Moreover, Roll suggests that 
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there is little reason to expect that a particular individual bidder can learn from his/her 
own previous mistakes and as such refrain from repeating this kind of behavior in future 
transactions. Bruton, Oviatt, and White (1994) examined the effect of acquisition 
experience on the firm's performance and drew comparisons between bidders acquiring 
distressed targets versus non-distressed targets. In 51 acquisitions of financially 
distressed firms, related business combinations in which the acquirers had prior 
acquisition experience performed best which supported earlier conclusions that 
acquisition experience has a positive impact on performance. However, the study found 
that business relatedness and acquisition experience had no effect on performance in a 
control group of 46 acquisitions of non-distressed targets. This result points out that the 
acquisition experience might be more valuable when acquiring distressed targets because 
it equips management with the ability to turn around the target and/or reshaping its 
activities, however, acquiring successful targets requires integrating functions and 
operations in order to extract synergies which is a harder source of value to master. 
The hubris theory implies that the average increase in the target firm's market 
value should be at least offset by the average decrease in the value of bidding firms, 
which was supported my many empirical studies reporting positive significant 
announcement returns for targets, insignificant or negative returns for acquirers on 
average, and positive returns for acquirers acquiring private targets (Chang, 1998; Huang 
& Walkling, 1987; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) developed several empirical proxies for CEO 
overconfidence and tested their effect on corporate investment. The authors characterized 
managers as overconfident if they failed to reduce their exposure to company-specific 
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risk. As such, managers holding deep in-the-money stock options for an extended period 
of time suggests that managers believe that their company's stock is still expected to 
climb further. The study shows that overconfident managers are biased in their 
investment decisions. Other studies attempted to characterize managers as overconfident 
using the world's perception of those managers rather than their own personal 
investment/divestment decisions (Malmendier & Tate, 2005b, 2009). Accordingly, CEOs 
who were found to achieve a "superstar" status in the press tended to underperform 
subsequently relative to the market and their hypothetical peers beyond mean reversion. 
This declining performance on part of overconfident management is at least partially 
attributed to their tendency to enjoy status by spending more time and effort 
extracurricular and social activities rather than focusing on their jobs at hand. 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) suggests that overconfident managers are inclined to 
perform several acquisitions in a short period of time, thus they test the impact of 
acquisitions by serial acquirers on their shareholders wealth. This study tests the 
overconfidence hypothesis as applied to merger and acquisitions, which suggests that 
overconfident managers are more inclined to perform value destructive mergers and 
acquisitions. The study indicates that overconfidence is attributed to self-attribution bias; 
managers tend to credit pervious successes or accomplishments to their superior abilities 
in picking merger targets and therefore become more overconfident. These managers 
realize lower announcement returns and exhibit poor long-term performance relative to 
"rational" managers. Two proxies were used to characterize managers as overconfident, 
first, managers were considered to be overconfident if they executed multiple mergers in 
a short period of time. Second, insider trading measured by the net holding of companies 
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stocks held by managers (stocks bought minus sold for the company). The sample 
utilized in the study included 5324 M&A deals in London stock market during the period 
1980 - 2004. The sample included public acquirers listed in London stock exchange 
acquiring Private targets. The study found that high-order mergers, defined as conducting 
5 or more deals within 3 years, produce poorer performance. 
The mispricing or market driven acquisitions theory highlights market wide 
mispricing of bidders and targets, rather than individual irrationality assumed by hubris 
and overconfidence theories on part of management. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
presented a theoretical model in which M&A transactions are driven my mispricing of 
acquirers and targets. The authors assume managers to be rational decision makers 
attempting to capitalize on market inefficiencies through acquiring mispriced targets and 
or using their own mispriced stock as currency. However, this view presents an opposite 
rational for management behavior compared to the hubris theory advanced by Roll 
(1986). 
According to Shleifer and Vishny's model, stock acquisitions increase with high 
overall market valuations and higher dispersion in valuation between targets and bidders. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that periods of high markets valuation tend 
to increase the volume of merger activity given that errors in estimating resulting 
synergies are often mistaken for market driven overvaluation despite the target's attempt 
to decouple both elements. As such, despite that management teams of target firms 
understand that part of the offered high acquisition valuations are due to market wide 
overvaluation, they are assumed to fail in correctly estimating synergies which increases 
the likelihood of deals being successfully consummated. Several studies offered 
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empirical support to the market-driven mispricing explanation of merger activity (see for 
example Ang and Cheng (2006)). 
Brown (2006) presented a model explaining M&A activity that integrated both 
forms of irrationality on the market side (Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 2003) and managerial optimism (Malmendier & Tate, 2005a; Roll, 1986). 
According to the model proposed by Brown's thesis, market valuation plays a stronger 
role in determining the method of payment in the merger deal while managerial optimism 
have a stronger impact on premiums paid. As such, empirical results pointed out that 
market overvaluation leads to stock mergers and undervaluation leads to cash mergers 
while optimistic managers, whether that of the acquiring or target firms, are generally 
associated with larger premiums. 
2.1.2 Performance of Bidders and Targets 
The area of examining value creation and performance for bidders and targets 
received attention in the merger and acquisitions body of research. In the area of 
corporate finance, earlier studies suggested that M&A deals create value on the outset. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) pointed out the empirical evidence available up to that point of 
time suggests that corporate takeovers generate positive gains with most of the gains 
going to target shareholders. The study concludes that shareholders of bidders do not lose 
and therefore M&A transactions involve value creation rather than mere redistribution. 
Jarrel, Brickley, and Netter (1988) highlight the apparently excessive premiums paid to 
targets and point out the acquiring firms receive at best modest increases in their stock 
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price, however, research findings regarding bidder's post-acquisition stock performance 
are mixed and inconclusive. 
Recently, more studies are showing that bidders do not always perform poorly 
post-acquisitions. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) document a size effect in the 
post-merger announcement returns. Studying a sample of 12,023 acquisitions made by 
public US bidders over the period 1980-2001, the study points out that acquisitions by 
small firms are profitable for their shareholders while large firms make large acquisitions 
resulting in large dollar losses. This size effect is robust to firm and deal characteristics 
and is not reversed over time. The average dollar change in wealth of acquiring-firm 
shareholders after acquisition announcement is negative. The study suggests that 
managers of large firms tend to pay more for acquisitions and are more likely to complete 
their deals which supports Roll's 1986 hubris hypothesis, while the size effect seems 
unrelated to overvaluation suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
Andre, Kooli, and L'Her (2004) provide an out of sample examination of the 
long-term performance of Mergers and Acquisitions up to three years post transaction 
using a sample of 267 transactions performed by Canadian bidders during 1980-2000 
period. The authors report that on average, Canadian acquiring firms underperform over 
the post-acquisition period. 
2.1.3 Factors Affecting Performance of Bidders and Targets 
Other studies attempted to explore the conditionality of bidder's returns on 
various firm and transaction related factors. For example, a number of papers examined 
the return of acquirers depending on whether they acquire publicly listed or private 
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targets, currency of acquisition used, relative size of target to bidder, acquisition 
experience and industry familiarity (Faccio, McConnell, & Stolin, 2005; Fowler & 
Schmidt, 1989; Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). 
Fowler and Schmidt (1989) studied the organizational and transactional factors 
affecting post-acquisition performance. This study extended previous research in the area 
of strategic management while attempting to test the impact of several factors on the 
long-term financial performance of acquiring firms including bidder's relative size, 
previous acquisition experience, organizational age, industry commonality, contested 
versus uncontested acquisitions, and percentage of stock acquired. Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller (2002) examined the returns to shareholders of firms making five or more 
successful bids within three years between 1990-2000 to hold bidder characteristics 
constant while studying the effects of target and transaction characteristics. The empirical 
design of the studied sample allowed the scholars to focus on examining the returns to 
acquirers making bids for public, private, and subsidiary targets, using cash and stock, 
and seeing how the acquirers' returns vary accordingly. The study concludes that 
shareholders on average gain when their company acquires a private target and returns 
tend to be positively related to the target's size, regardless of whether the bidder uses 
stock or cash as the acquisition currency. In addition the study reports that acquisitions of 
public targets result in insignificant bidder returns using either cash or a combination of 
cash/stock but turns to be significantly negative in case bidders used stock. 
Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2005) examined returns achieved by firms 
acquiring public (listed) and private (unlisted) targets. This paper examined 
announcement period abnormal returns to acquirers of listed and unlisted targets in 17 
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countries in Western Europe over the interval 1996-2001. Acquirers of listed targets 
earned an insignificant average abnormal while acquirers of unlisted targets earned a 
significant average abnormal return, which was described by the authors as a "Listing 
Effect". This listing effect was shown by the authors to be consistent through time and 
across countries and is robust after controlling for the method of payment, acquirer's size, 
Tobin's Q, pre-announcement leakage of information about the transaction, resulting 
acquirer's ownership structure, and host of other variables. 
A number of scholars conducted Meta-Analysis studies on M&A performance in 
the strategic management literature. A recent effort in this line of work is a Meta-
Analysis study by King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004). The authors analyzed earlier 
empirical research studying the performance of M&A transactions, the quest to extract 
synergy, and the likely impact of acquisition experience on the deal performance. The 
authors point out that at the outset that the observed enthusiasm among managers of 
bidding firms for M&A transactions might not be justified. Further, earlier studies did not 
consistently identify factors contributing to the post-acquisition performance of M&A 
deals. The authors point out that sources for synergy are still illusive in academic 
research. Acquiring related firms leads to increased post-acquisition performance, while 
diversifying transactions have contradictory effects on firm's performance. Despite many 
scholars buy into the theoretical argument that acquisition experience should enable 
managers to identify and extract values and better integrate companies after acquisitions, 
several research papers failed to support empirically such assertion of a relationship 
between acquisition experience and performance. 
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2.1.4 Currency/Mode of Mergers and Acquisitions 
One of the other areas that attracted attention in this body of research is the mode 
of conducting acquisitions. A key study in this line of research is the work advanced by 
Faccio and Masulis (2005). This study examined the bidders' choice of payment method 
in European mergers and acquisitions and described a tradeoff taking place between the 
bidder's corporate control threats, which discouraged stock financing, and the bidder's 
financing constraints, which encourages stock financing. The authors point out that the 
bidder's choice between using cash or stock as currency for acquisition is implicitly a 
choice between debt and stock financing respectively. Accordingly, bidders resort to cash 
as the currency for acquisition when having a significant borrowing capacity and/or risk 
reduction of control over the firm post acquisition as a result of introducing new block 
shareholders. 
2.2 BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND PROSPECT THEORY 
2.2.1 Behavioral Finance 
The area of behavioral finance received increasing levels of attention over the past 
few years due to its potential to explain the increasingly documented anomalies in 
financial markets under the previous raining paradigm. Depending on key ground 
breaking research studies conducted during the last decade, behavioral finance overcame 
the taboo of market efficiency and commanded deep consideration by researchers and 
practitioners. 
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Shleifer & Summers (1990) proposed the idea that behavioral finance rests on two 
main building blocks, namely, Limits of arbitrage and psychology. Figure 1 sketches the 
behavioral finance literature based on this proposition and the widely agreed upon 
organization of recent surveys covering this area (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Hirshleifer, 
2001; Shleifer, 2000). The building blocks of research in the behavioral finance area are 
summarized in figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The rational paradigm to financial economics has been the favored frame of 
analysis for financial economics for a long time. Most economic and financial research 
conducted up to early 90's assumed rational economic agents and consistent beliefs. This 
frame of analysis considered any unexplained phenomena as anomalies representing 
outliers to that frame. For quite some time, such anomalies were indeed considered 
outliers; however, this view was weekend by the increasing scholarly research 
documenting the regular occurrences of such anomalies. 
Kahneman (2003) points out several groundbreaking studies documenting such 
anomalies. First, all traders in a stock market believed that their performance is above 
average (Odean, 1999). This negates the common finding that most traders fail to 
outperform the market portfolio through active investment strategy. Second, investors 
and traders in the stock market are often believed to be myopic and loss averse as found 
and applied by Benartzi & Thaler (1995). Third, Kahneman points out the other studies 
implying traders who are too quick to jump on conclusions, use quasi-hyperbolic 
preferences, or find problems in self-control. 
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Barberis & Thaler (2003) describe the general assumptions of the rational 
paradigm as well as the approach adopted by the behavioral finance literature to relax 
these assumptions. The two main assumptions of the traditional paradigm are investors' 
rationality and consistent (homogenous) beliefs. On one hand, Kahneman (2003) 
highlights that the rationality assumption implies that economic agents maximize their 
subjective expected utility involving Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and a 
Bayesian belief structure. In other words, economic agents have the objective to 
maximize their utilities through adjusting their prior beliefs correctly to new information 
(Bayesian updating) and making normatively correct decisions based on those updated 
beliefs. On the other hand, the second assumption is guaranteed if economic agents are 
expected to be homogenous in terms of their beliefs and their decision-making in addition 
to the information set at their disposal to make decisions. Under this paradigm, arbitrage 
forces help to control any temporary mispricing in financial markets. 
Shleifer (2000) points to the proposed role to be played by rational arbitrageurs 
under the traditional paradigm to correct for any mispricing in financial markets. If 
irrational investors (noise traders) caused a mispricing to occur in in asset prices, rational 
arbitrageurs (arbitrageurs) would be able to pinpoint this mispricing opportunity and 
fashion an appropriate profitable risk less investment strategy to achieve profits which 
closes this mispricing. Despite that the rationale governing the role played by rational 
arbiteragures in closing down any mispricing seems attractive in theory, Shleifer 
highlights the existence of many obstacles to this arbitrage process that essentially limit 
its capacity to correct for mispricing caused by noise traders. Therefore, arbitrage is 
expected to fail to fully confront mispricing forces in the market. 
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Further, Barberis & Thaler (2003) point out that the competing paradigm 
challenged the traditional framework through invoking investor's irrationality as well as 
heterogeneity between economic agents and less than full information available to 
decision makers. This in essence implies heterogeneous beliefs and investors 
dissimilarity. 
2.2.2 Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) discussed the shortcomings of the expected utility 
theory in explaining economic behavior (decision making) of agents in the economy. 
They highlighted that the Expected Utility theory (Rationality) depends on two essential 
assumptions that are Dominance and Invariance. Dominance essentially means that a 
prospect "A" would be preferred to prospect "B" if they are similar in all respects but 
prospect "A" is better in at least one aspect while Invariance is defined as the assumption 
that economic agents understand the choice at hand in a similar way regardless of the 
approach in which it was described or "Framed". In other words, economic agents make 
the same decisions facing the same problems packaged in different ways. In their attempt 
to refute the Expected Utility theory explained above, Kahneman and Tversky contended 
that the Dominance and Invariance assumptions cannot be considered as a true 
representation of reality, further, new theories deviating from these principles in the 
future could account for some commonly observed anomalies in economic decision 
making. For example, the authors show that the decision made by a representative agent 
changes depending on whether a particular negative outcome is packaged (framed) as a 
cost or an uncompensated loss, which violates the invariance assumption. Choices made 
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by agents given different framing approaches are addressed in detail through the prospect 
theory. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) articulated how the prospect theory accounts for 
violations to the Dominance and Invariance principles of the Expected Utility theory. 
Tversky and Kahneman do not challenge the normative value of the rationality decision-
making process which prevailed earlier. While rational decision-making is an absolute 
ideal, they stress that violations are so frequent, profound, and persistent to be ignored. 
Therefore, the prospect theory does not attempt to approach the decision making process 
in a normative manner, but rather in a descriptive sense. Essentially, it focuses on how 
decision-making and choices are actually made rather than how they should be ideally 
made, which offers an approach to explain actual behavior by economic agents in various 
arenas. Tversky and Kahneman proposed through the prospect theory a value/utility 
function, convex over losses and concave over gains, which results in a shifting risk 
taking attitude depending on the current position relative to a reference point 
(gains/losses) which deviates from the dominance principle (some choices are rejected in 
some situations but accepted in others). In addition, a choice would have different utility 
to the decision maker depending on whether it is framed as a disadvantage or a reduction 
of a previous advantage (absolute loss vs. reduction in profit). 
The prospect theory was first developed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) to offer 
a parsimonious explanation to several anomalies that the Expected Utility theory failed to 
explain. The main thesis of this theory is that the carriers of utility are not total wealth 
and eventual consumption as proposed by earlier economic theories but rather 
fluctuations in financial wealth. An integrated concept in this theory is the concept of 
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Mental Accounting. Many papers offered detailed descriptions of the mental accounting 
concept including Thaler (1999), according to which Mental Accounting is generally 
defined as the tendency of economic agents (investors) to categorize their holdings and 
activities in separate accounts for the purpose of following up changes in a similar 
fashion as the accounting process in a firm. 
Thaler pointed out that mental accounting necessarily includes three sub-concepts. 
First, how outcomes are perceived, experienced, and evaluated. Second, assigning certain 
functions to different accounts (example: consuming dividends and avoiding to liquidate 
stock holdings). Third, how often are these mental accounts reviewed (daily, weekly, 
monthly, and yearly). Kahneman and Tversky integrated this concept into the prospect 
theory in order to convey the idea that individuals place gains and losses in different 
mental accounts and assign them with different utility functions, evaluation perspective, 
and resulting risk taking attitude. The scholars developed this initial version of the 
prospect theory governing separate gambles and documented their observation that losses 
loom larger than gains in individual utility. Accordingly, they proposed a hypothetical S-
shaped value/utility function shown in the figure 2. 
[ Insert Figure 2 here] 
While utility was assumed to be a function of wealth because of its consumption 
value, the prospect theory points out that the amount of pain or regret that an individual 
feels as a result of a loss is larger than the amount of comfort or happiness resulting from 
gains of the same magnitude. This differential sensitivity to gains and loss affects the 
risk-taking attitude of investors in the following manner: individuals tend to take more 
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risk (risk seeking) after confronting losses and avoid risk (risk averse) after achieving 
gain. 
The main building blocks of the prospect theory as manifested in the proposed S-
shaped utility curve of economic agents include, first, Loss Aversion that reflects the idea 
that economic agents are more sensitive to losses than to gains. This shows up in the kink 
at the point of origin of the S-shaped utility function. Second, Diminishing Utility or 
Curvature refers to the concavity of the utility function over the territory of gains and 
convexity over the territory of losses. Third, Non-linear Probability Weighting, which 
reflects individuals' tendency to overweight prospects that are either certain or with very 
low probabilities relative to, prospects with moderate probabilities. 
In an empirical setting, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) tested the risk-return 
relationship implied by the prospect theory. The authors operationalized the definition of 
the reference point necessary in the prospect theory to measure gains and losses as the 
industry average return levels borrowing from the financial statements analysis literature. 
Using a data set of U.S companies from the COMPUSTAT database, they found a 
negative association between risk and return for companies below target return levels. In 
other words, companies with return levels below industry average exhibited a negative 
relationship between risk and return while returns above this average exhibited the 
expected positive relation between risk and return. They interpreted their results as 
offering empirical support to the predictions of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) proposed a revised version of the prospect theory 
which they called the "Cumulative Prospect theory" to offer better description to series of 
gambles with higher uncertainties and with more than two prospects. This study extended 
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the earlier version of the prospect theory in terms of the risk taking attitudes of 
individuals facing sequence of gambles. Contrary to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) 
thesis that gains invoke risk avoidance and losses invite risk seeking on part of 
individuals, the Cumulative prospect theory offers fourfold risk attitudes. In specific, 
individuals tend to be risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses with high 
probabilities; however, they tend to be risk taking over gains and risk averse over losses 
with low probabilities. 
Some studies looked at the application of the prospect theory's main thesis to risk 
less decision-making and choices. In another paper, Tversky and Kahneman utilized the 
concept of loss aversion in structuring reference-dependent indifference curves (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1991). This effort shed light on the idea that changes in reference points 
created reversals in preferences which helped explaining anomalies observed based on 
violations to the invariance principle of the rational decision making approach. 
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler (1991) extended the arguments of the prospect 
theory in order to explain other commonly observed biases in economic transactions 
based upon the loss aversion concept. This study highlighted several biases affecting 
individual's behavior, namely, The Endowment Effect and Status Quo Bias. Building on 
the loss aversion idea, that the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility 
associated with acquiring it, the endowment effect reflect the discrepancy between the 
price that people endowed with an object will require for selling this object and the price 
they are willing to pay to replace it. Formally, willingness to pay is lower than the 
willingness to accept. In addition, given the higher sensitivity for loses, faced with 
uncertain situation, individuals prefer the current status rather than entering into a 
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transaction in which they might either acquire or sell the objects that they were endowed 
with. A number of papers applied the concept of disposition effect in the area of funds 
management and investment (Cici, 2010; Locke & Mann, 2000; Shefrin & Statman, 
1985; Teo & O'Connell, 2003). 
The agreement among scholars regarding the predictions of the prospect theory 
under risk-less choice is not universal. For example, List (2004) tested the predictions of 
the prospect theory against that of the neoclassical theory. A key element in this study 
was market place experience suggesting that the level of experience of consumers 
(decision makers) has a strong bearing on the degree to which they exhibit behavior 
conformable with the prospect theory predicted pattern of behavior. The study pointed 
out that on one hand subjects participating in the study and having high level of open 
market experience tend to behave in a manner parallel to that predicted by the 
neoclassical theory, in other words, they do not exhibit the Endowment Effect suggested 
by the prospect theory. Nevertheless, the prospect theory tends to capture the behavior of 
less experienced subjects. Moreover, as the learning opportunities become more 
abundant, individuals overcome the endowment effect bias. 
2.2.3 Loss Aversion And Myopia 
Perhaps the first influential study using the loss aversion concept conveyed by the 
prospect theory to explain asset prices behavior in capital markets is the study conducted 
by Benartzi and Thaler (1995), which attempted to explain the equity puzzle (i.e. the 
observation that equity returns are very high relative to government bonds). Two main 
explanations were suggested for this puzzle, specifically, the existence of excessive risk 
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aversion by investors or unrealistically high risk-free rate of return. The study integrated 
the loss aversion concept and the concept of narrow framing (high frequency of 
evaluating mental accounts) to introduce the concept of Myopic Loss Aversion. Using the 
myopic loss aversion concept, the scholars simulated such large equity premiums 
commonly observed in financial markets. The paper adopted the most common revision 
frequency, annual revision, depending on the idea that individuals go through many 
accounting cycles forcing them to adopt this revision frequency. In other words, 
individuals pay taxes annually forcing them to evaluate their wealth accounts. 
Incorporating this revision frequency in a mathematical formulation for the utility theory 
implied by the prospect theory through simulations enabled the authors to explain what 
had been know as the equity puzzle. 
The authors followed up on their earlier study by putting their annual revision 
frequency assumption to the test in order to examine retirement planning decisions 
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1999). Through studying asset allocations and retirement planning, 
the results of the study suggested that longer revision periods (slower frequency) result in 
higher allocations to stocks. Accordingly, a yearly revision speed -Myopia- is a sound 
assumption that helps explain the high risk-aversion by investors and their shying away 
from stocks. The idea of myopia is widely agreed upon and used by researchers in 
studying the effects of loss aversion on different financial phenomena. Gneezy & Potters 
(1997) adopted an experimental analysis approach to test the notion that myopia increases 
risk aversion, in other words, higher frequency of evaluating investments increased 
investor's risk aversion and decreased the attractiveness of risky investments (stock). 
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Their study provides support to the Myopic Loss Aversion concept introduced by Benartzi 
and Thaler and the general idea that myopia increases risk aversion. 
One point of caution is due regarding the concept of myopia. While the idea that 
increasing myopia reduces the attractiveness of risky choices is sensible and intuitive, 
some studies called the generalization of this concept into question (Langer & Weber, 
2005). This study showed, through simulation, that higher myopia does not generally 
increase risk aversion. Langer and Weber shed light on the importance of conditioning 
this relation on the profile of the risky investment. Their results concluded that lotteries 
with small gains associated with high probabilities invite investors to become most risk 
taking if feedback is offered more frequently, in other words, the risky choice with such 
profile gets more attractive the more myopic investors become. These results do not 
negate the general thesis of the myopic loss aversion concept but rather warns that this 
relation is not universal. 
An interesting question that emerged in the area of financial research after initial 
experimental evidence supporting the existence of the Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) bias 
among non-professionals, student subjects to be specific, is whether the MLA bias can 
also be found in the case of professional traders. Haigh and List (2005) addressed this 
issue directly using experimental manipulation and comparing the behavior of 
professional traders recruited from the CBOT (Chicago Board Of Trade) against students. 
While the results seem to suggest that differences in behavior does in fact appear between 
professionals and non-professional, however, the results suggest that professional 
investors seem to exhibit a myopic loss averse behavior (MLA) to a greater extent than 
students. In other words, professional traders seemed to place larger and more aggressive 
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bets to recover losses relative to those offered by students. This study is one of the very 
few experimental studies appearing in The Journal of Finance indicating the qualitative 
importance of its results which suggest that similar biases are not expected to disappear 
with higher experience. 
2.2.4 House Money Effect 
Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz (1997) tested the two components of 
the Myopic Loss Aversion concept and supported the propositions of Benartzi and Thaler. 
Their experimental results indicated that subjects tended to be more risk averse the higher 
the feedback/evaluation frequency (faster evaluation/shorter evaluation period). In 
addition, facing gains which reduced the chance of potential future losses, subjects tend 
to be risk seeking. Similarly, Thaler and Johnson (1990) suggested the same tendency of 
risk seeking over gains territory. The scholars coined this behavior as the "House Money 
Effect" which draws an analogy between individual behavior and a gambler facing risky 
choice after achieving some profits. Through the mental accounting concept, the gambler 
isolate his wins into "House money" and therefore does not feel high pain as a result of 
deductions from that account. This psychological framing process induces a risk taking 
behavior by individuals in similar situations. 
An important study by Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001), attempted to model 
the utility propositions offered by the prospect theory in the area of financial economics 
in light of the failure of the previous consumption based utility models to capture many 
of the regularities of financial assets behavior documented in earlier research. The study 
pointed out the following; first, earlier research aimed at understanding stock market 
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behavior (prices, returns, volatility, and predictability) was dominated by Consumption-
Based Models approach which assumed utility to be a function of lifetime consumption 
and therefore total wealth is critical in deriving utility. Second, Consumption-Based 
models could not explain the attributes of empirical data including high average returns, 
high volatility, predictability over the cross section and time series, and low correlation 
between stock volatility and consumption volatility. 
Barberis et al (2001) looked at how investors define their utility from the prospect 
theory perspective. Accordingly, investors derive utility from consumption and 
fluctuations in value of their financial wealth. In other words, gains and losses are 
additional carrier of utility along with consumption. Their approach captured two ideas. 
First, Loss Aversion, which means that investors are more sensitive to reductions than 
increases in wealth. Second, the non-constant nature of the degree of loss aversion 
experienced by economic agents through time. Rather, the degree of loss aversion was 
assumed to be conditional on prior outcomes (previous gains and losses). In other words, 
the degree of loss aversion varies according to prior investment performance (less loss 
averse after gains and vice versa). The authors simulated stock returns and price-dividend 
ratios utilizing the prospect theory generating high level of returns, high levels of 
volatility, significant predictability, low correlation with consumption growth, and 
low/stable risk-free interest rate as previously pointed out to be important empirical 
regularities of returns behavior. The authors adopted a novel utility function 
incorporating fluctuations in financial wealth (which is a function of current and 
reference prices in addition to previous/historical investment performance) in addition to 
the traditionally acceptable consumption based utility term. The intuitive prediction of 
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this specification is that if investors have accumulated prior gains providing a cushion 
against future losses, they tend to get aggressive in their investment behavior. Similarly, 
if investors were burned by earlier losses, they tend to be excessively 
sensitive/conservative. This prediction is parallel to the "House Money Effect" (Thaler & 
Johnson, 1990) and contrary to the initial predictions of the prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). 
The difference between both predictions can be simply visualized in Figure (3). In 
graph (B), previous gains serve as a cushion against future losses and therefore reduce 
sensitivity to immediate losses, and vice versa in case of previous losses. Barberis et al. 
(2001) argued that this opposite prediction regarding risk attitude is not a failure to the 
prospect theory, but rather, is an evidence against the Sequential Integration Hypothesis 
assuming that investors integrate their prior performance history/memory and evaluate 
risky outcomes in isolation. The authors agree with the higher sensitivity of investors to 
losses than gains, but by disagreeing with the Sequential Integration Hypothesis, produce 
opposing risk attitude predictions. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Other studies attempted to test empirically the reaction of investors to various 
definitions of loss and gains (Massa & Simonov, 2005). The authors collected a 
comprehensive data set including assets holdings, real estate investments, and tax 
accountings of representative investors in Stockholm stock exchange. The study 
concluded that their results about risk attitudes after gains and losses support either the 
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revised predictions of the prospect theory or standard utility theory but fail to support the 
initial predictions of the prospect theory. 
Barberis and Huang (2001) examined the proposed model by Barberis et al. 
(2001) under two different mental accounting processes, namely, whether investors 
conduct mental accounting on the level of individuals stocks or portfolio holdings. The 
simulation results provided by Barberis and Huang employing narrow framing 
perspective, individual stocks, appear to be closer the empirical regularities of stock 
prices (high mean returns, excess volatility, predictability, and loss correlation to 
consumption). The authors utilized their results to expand the discussion about the impact 
of changing framing effects (mental accounting) on asset prices. Accordingly, if investors 
are forced to evaluate their holdings on portfolio levels, their expected degree of loss 
aversion is expected to fall because gains and losses are balanced to an extent in the 
portfolio. Another implication is that the degree of loss aversion exhibited by investors 
should be expected to change over time as a function of changing historical return 
performance over time. In a later review, Barberis and Huang (2008) stressed that 
modeling utility according to the prospect theory's carriers of utility was more successful 
compared to consumption-based models in equity returns in order to explain the equity 
premium puzzle. 
2.2.5 The Prospect Theory in Investment Research 
A sizable strand of research in the area of investment focuses on explaining 
commonly observed phenomena that is overreaction and underreaction of prices to news. 
In general, many studies utilized event study based methodologies in order to examine 
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the response of stock prices to firm news. The results reported by such studies shed light 
on the efficiency assumption of capital markets. A recent effort representing an 
interesting approach to the idea of underreaction from the prospect theory perspective is 
the study conducted by Frazzini (2006). Frazzini built upon the idea of disposition effect 
to offer an explanation for the underreaction anomaly. According to this study, since 
investors are disposed to sell winners too early, good news are not fully reflected in asset 
prices due to the selling pressure resulting after good events taking place. Therefore, the 
initial price response is below the full potential price response to news resulting in a post 
announcement drift in prices/returns. The explanation offered by Frazzini seems intuitive 
and offers a theoretical explanation to the anomaly of momentum profitability discovered 
by the seminal work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) (Buying past winners and selling 
past losers to construct a zero-cost portfolio results in significant abnormal holding 
returns). 
Coval and Shumway (2005) offered an empirical support to Haigh and List 
(2005), using a dataset from the same source, namely, CBOT based traders. This study 
revealed how risk-taking attitudes, as manifested in trading behavior, reflect intra-day 
gains and losses. Simply putting it, the authors found that traders tend to be more 
aggressive and risk-seeking in the afternoon session to recover morning losses. These 
results corroborated the experimental findings of Haigh and List (2005) in terms that 
professional traders exhibit behavior in congruence with the myopic loss aversion 
concept. Coval and Shumway add an interesting remark that price pressures caused by 
such loss averse investors can be distinguished by the market and therefore prices tend to 
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reverse quickly. That is, price pressures of traders with morning gains tend to be more 
persistent than price pressures exercised by traders with morning losses. 
2.2.5 Prospect Theory in Corporate Finance 
The first attempt to utilize the prospect theory to explain managerial behavior in 
the area of corporate finance is the research presented by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005). 
This study investigated the potential explanatory power of the prospect theory in driving 
managerial satisfaction from previous underwriting experiences that would impact their 
decision to hire the same underwriter for subsequent equity or debt issues. By introducing 
a proxy for managerial satisfaction based on the monetary gain to managerial portfolios 
driven by stock price changes subsequent to the initial public offering, the authors show 
that satisfied managers (achieved gains; trading price exceeded offer price) tend to stick 
with the same underwriters in future offerings. This observation is similar to the 
endowment effect in a sense that managers feel reluctant to give away their positive 
experience with an underwriter and therefore tend to prefer the status quo by hiring the 
same underwriter. 
The dearth of empirical research applying the prospect theory to various areas of 
corporate finance decisions and in explaining managerial behavior creates a strong 
potential contribution for further research conducted in these areas. Among the corporate 
decisions that standout as a prime candidate to test these behavioral predictions of the 




HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 HYPOTHESES 
The Prospect theory suggests that decision makers tend to be more aggressive or 
risk taking after a loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 
1992). The Quasi-Hedonic Hypothesis suggests that decision makers will tend to be more 
aggressive (risk taking) after repeated gains {House Money Effect) but tend to be more 
risk averse after losses in order to avoid further pain. Nevertheless, decision makers tend 
to be more risk taking after losses if there is a chance for a breakeven (Barberis, et al., 
2001; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). These two views are adopted to formulate competing 
hypotheses regarding the reaction of bidders experiencing various forms and proxies of 
loss in relation to choices and decisions made during their subsequent acquisitions. 
Should neither hypothesis be supported by the empirical tests conducted in this study, a 
conclusion can be drawn that changes in wealth (gains and losses) as carriers of utility 
with bearing on post gain/loss risk aversion as proposed by the prospect theory (as 
measured by the proxies suggested later) may not have an impact on corporate 
investment decisions. 
3.1.1 Public Vs. Non-Public Target Choice 
Capron and Shen (2007) studied the factors that influence bidder's decision to 
choose a public vs. non-public targets and subsequent performance. The study draws a 
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conclusion that bidders favor private targets in familiar industries and turn to public 
targets to enter new business domains or industries with a high level of intangible assets. 
One key difference between private and public firm acquisitions is the quantity and 
quality of information available on private vs. public targets. Information on public firms 
is more widely available to bidders, whereas managers of private firms typically have 
better control over the information they want to communicate. As such, the market for 
corporate control for public firms serves as an information-processing and asset valuation 
mechanism, which is available to all bidders, thus complements the acquirer's own 
information processing and asset valuation capabilities. From an information asymmetry 
perspective, private targets seems to pose additional risk for the bidder. 
H1(A)-' After suffering a previous loss, serial bidders tend to become more aggressive and 
are more likely to acquire non-public targets. 
H1(B).' After suffering a previous loss, serial bidders tend to become more risk-averse and 
are more likely to acquire public targets. 
3.1.2. Local Vs. Foreign Target Choice 
Shimizu et al. (2004) conducted a survey study on the theoretical and empirical 
studies addressing cross-border M&A transactions. The study discusses the riskiness of 
acquiring foreign targets by summing up the challenges faced by bidders as suggested by 
earlier research. Accordingly, firms engaging in cross-border M&A face unique risks 
including the liability of foreignness, double-layered acculturation, and the added 
uncertainty and information asymmetry prevailing in unfamiliar markets, which hinders 
organizational learning. However, bidders can achieve benefits by entering markets with 
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lower competition and by obtaining better access to sources of supply or markets. It may 
be noted that serial bidders going abroad may seek to mitigate such risks through various 
strategies including joining forces with other local companies, entering countries with 
relatively similar competitive forces and market mechanisms, and/or pursuing markets 
with minimal local incumbents and limited foreign competition. These strategies may 
conceal/mitigate the inherent riskness of moving abroad and as such weaker explanatory 
power can be expected for prospect theory risk attitude provisions, however, the 
following two hypotheses are proposed for the purpose of empirical testing. 
H2(Aj: After suffering a previous loss, serial bidders tend to become more aggressive and 
are more likely to acquire foreign targets. 
H2(B).' After suffering a previous loss, serial bidders tend to become more risk-averse and 
are more likely to acquire local targets. 
3.1.3 Related Vs. Unrelated Target 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) found that returns to bidders conducting 
diversifying mergers (acquiring non-related targets) are generally low. The authors point 
out that management of acquiring firms involved in diversifying takeover transaction are 
penalized by the market because they are considered investing in an industry in which 
their managerial capabilities and knowledge is not useful. The authors conclude that 
managerial objectives may drive acquisitions that reduce bidding firms' values. The 
lower level of managerial familiarity with unrelated industries poses additional risks to 
bidders and as such management or often penalized by the market for such steps. 
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Therefore the apparent higher risk of investing in unrelated industries is the underlying 
motivation for the following hypotheses. 
H3(A).' After suffering a previous loss, serial bidders tend to become more aggressive and 
are more likely to acquire targets in unrelated industries. 
H3(B).' After suffering a previous loss, serial bidders tend to become more risk-averse and 
are more likely to acquire targets in related industries. 
3.1.4 Premiums and Overpayment 
Following the propositions offered by the prospect theory, more aggressive or risk 
taking managers are expected to overpay for their targets in order to close the deal and 
avoid a loss. This interpretation developed in line with the prospect theory can compete 
with rival theoretical hypotheses attempting to explain premiums paid by bidders 
including hubris/overconfidence, overvaluation, and agency theories. 
H4(A).' After suffering a previous loss, serial bidders tend to become more aggressive and 
are more likely to overpay for their potential targets while controlling for other factors. 
H4(B).' After suffering a previous loss, serial bidders tend to become more risk-averse and 
are less likely to overpay for their potential targets while controlling for other factors. 
3.2 SAMPLE AND DATA 
3.2.1 Sample 
M&A transactions sample was obtained from the Thomson Reuter's SDC 
database of U.S publically traded bidders making two (2) or more acquisitions during the 
34 
sample period. The sample includes 16,582 completed and uncompleted M&A 
attempts/transactions conducted by 3,512 bidders over the 1990-2005 period covering all 
48 Fama-French industrial classification (including regulated banking and utilities 
sectors). The results for various subsamples are reported in the empirical findings for the 
whole sample, a subsample that excludes regulated sectors (i.e. banks and utilities), 
bidders without uncompleted deals, bidders with uncompleted deals, in addition to 
various sub samples to check for robustness. Bidders' daily stock returns were obtained 
from the CRSP database while bidders and targets financial details were obtained from 
the COMPUSTAT database. Detailed information regarding management teams of 
bidders in the sample including managerial stock holdings, option holdings and annual 
compensation data were obtained from the ExecComp database. In addition, industry 
classifications and factor returns during the sample period were obtained from the online 
data library of Prof. Kenneth R. French. 
Target firms in the sample include public and non-public targets as well as U.S 
based and foreign targets. If a target is involved in an uncompleted deal, there is a chance 
that this target will later be acquired either by the same bidder or by a totally different 
firm. 385 firms in the sample were involved at least once in an acquisition transaction 
after being involved in an earlier uncompleted M&A deal. The total number of 
transactions completed by bidders are 15,713 transactions (94%) of the total sample. Out 
of the 3,512 bidders included in the sample, 697 bidders were involved in 1 or more 
uncompleted acquisition transaction. The ratio of uncompleted deals to total deals 
attempted by the latter subgroup of bidders is 20%. 
[ Insert Table 1 here] 
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Panels B and C in table 1 shows the distribution of the sample transactions over 
the time period covered (1990 - 2005) and across Fama-French 48 industries 
classification. It can be noted that 43.65% of all transactions in the sample take place 
during the 1996 - 1999 period. Sampled transactions exhibit some degree of industrial 
clustering, specifically, the business services, banking, and financial trading sectors 
represent 17.9%, 9.9%, and 8.7% of total sample size respectively. In order to address 
this temporal and cross sectional clustering, separate regressions are reported for sub-
periods in the sample and incorporating industry medians data to test the robustness of 
the reported results. 
3.2.2. Measuring Previous Losses 
I adopted five different definitions of the loss suffered by bidding firms and their 
management teams in previous transactions/periods. 
1- Market Reaction/Feedback: this is the market reaction to the announcement of 
previous attempts/transactions announced by the bidders. The market reaction is 
calculated as the standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) computed 
around the announcement date(s) of previous attempts/transactions. I computed raw 
and standardized CARs using various windows surrounding the announcement and 
finalization dates using equally and value weighted portfolios. The results provided in 
the empirical results tables employ the standardized CARs using equally-weighted 
portfolios and using (-5,-1-5) estimation window around announcement dates. The 
CARs for the previous 3 transactions by a certain bidder are denoted PCAR_1, 
PCAR_2 and PCAR_3 respectively. A negative PCAR suggests that the market 
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penalized management for bad acquisition choice/decision made and therefore may 
possibly be coded as a loss from the bidder's perspective. 
2- Relative Industry Performance: The bidder's industry adjusted stock return during the 
fiscal year preceding an M&A transaction. A company might have positive annual 
return during the preceding year, however, comparing a company's performance to its 
peers can reflect management's focus on their peers and industry rivals. As such, a 
negative industry relative return, despite a positive over absolute return, may be code 
as a loss or poor performance by bidders. The relative industry-adjusted stock return 
of each bidder is calculated using the value weighted returns of Fama-French 48 
industry classification over the fiscal year preceding a merger attempt/transaction. 
The use of a fiscal year was adopted in line with the revision frequency suggested by 
the myopic loss aversion concept discussed earlier. 
3- M&A Success History: a number of binary/Dummy variables taking the value 1 if the 
bidder failed to complete the previous acquisition attempt(s) are introduced to the 
regression models reflecting the lost time, organizational resources, and ego (pain) 
resulting from the inability to close a deal. Therefore, if a bidder announced an M&A 
transaction but couldn't close it and the transaction was eventually abandoned, this 
would be used as proxy for pain/loss experienced by the bidder's management team. 
4- Change in Management Compensation: a number of variables are introduced to 
model the annual change in compensation of the bidder's management team. I include 
the top 5 company executives as part of the management team. Results are produced 
initially using a measure of total compensation change experienced jointly by the top 
management team of the bidder (the change in the compensation of the top 5 
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members of the management/executive team) in the year preceding an acquisition 
transaction. Later in the empirical results chapter, this measure in dissected further 
into 4 compensation change proxies including (i) Percentage change in cash 
compensation of top executive, (ii) Percentage change in the non-cash compensation 
of the top executive, (iii) Percentage change in the cash compensation of the top 
management team (excluding top executive) and (iv) the Percentage change in non-
cash compensation of the top management team (excluding top executive). 
5- Change in Bidder's Bottom-line Performance: the change of the company's operating 
performance during the preceding fiscal year to the merger attempt/transaction. This 
is measured as the change in bidder's net income before extraordinary items (NIBEX) 
over two consecutive years during the fiscal year preceding the acquisition 
attempt/transaction. 
It is important to note that Market Reaction/Feedback proxies do not involve a 
clear reference point to the management team involved in making critical M&A decisions 
for their companies. The Relative Industry Performance proxies involve a sense of 
comparison of the bidder's own performance to peers, as such the reference point is cross 
sectional, as applied by Morck et al (1990), rather than temporally defined as implied by 
the theoretical framework of the prospect theory. Relative performance can provide 
insights into management behavior to the extent that management teams have a sense of 
competitiveness with rival management teams of firms in their same industry. However, 
the reference point is not as clear and may vary from one manager to another depending 
on which companies he or she perceives to be direct benchmarks and rivals as opposed to 
Fama French classification which is used to define rival bidders. 
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The M&A Success history of the bidder signifies the ability and willingness of the 
management to close previous transactions. Given the broken deal costs and ego issues 
suffered by managers walking away from acquisition attempts post announcement, an 
uncompleted deal may be perceived as a loss by management. The Managerial 
Compensation proxies provide a clearer definition of the personal gain/loss experienced 
by management. The reference point is also temporally defined and adopts the preferred 
annual framing and revision frequency (compensation changes are often decided annually 
upon reviewing various firm's results and industry wide factors by the board of directors 
and shareholders). The Change in Company Performance proxy provides a measure of 
temporal change in company's bottom line performance (net income before extraordinary 
items). 
3.2.3 Data Definitions 
Dependent Variables: 
1- Public: is a dummy variable taking the value of (1) in case of publicly traded target 
and (0) if otherwise. 
2- LocalJTarget: is a dummy variable taking the value of (1) in case of a U.S based 
target and (0) otherwise. 
3- Related_Target: is a dummy variable taking the value of (1) in case the bidder and 
targets operate in related industries and (0) if otherwise. 
4- Premium: Ratio of the offer price to a pre-deal value proxy of the target (Offer Price / 
Pre-announcement target value). Four (4) proxies are reported in the empirical results 
chapter including (i) offer price divided by the target's stock price prevailing 1-day 
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prior to the announcement, (ii) offer price divided by the target's stock price 
prevailing 1-week prior to the announcement, (iii) offer price divided by the target's 
stock price prevailing 4-weeks prior to the announcement date, and (iv) offer value 
dividend by the total assets value of the target. 
5- Relative Size: the relative size measure is calculated as the Implied Market Value of 
the target dividend by the market capitalization of the bidder. The implied target 
value is calculated as the deal value divided by the percentage shareholding sought by 
the bidder. This proxy is used given that 80.8% of targets in the sample are private 
and as such direct market values are not observable. 
6- Period-to-Close: this is the number of calendar days between the announcement and 
completion/withdrawal date of a single deal. 
7- Intra-Deals Period: this is the number of calendar days between the announcement 
date of the current deal and the completion/withdrawal date of the previous deal by 
the same bidder. Another definition of this variable is the number of calendar days 
between the announcement dates of the current and previous deals by the same bidder 
(the empirical results chapter reports results using the first definition of this variable). 
Loss Proxy Variables: 
8- Market Reaction/Feedback (PCAR_1, PCAR_2 and PCAR_3): these are the first, 
second and third deal lagged equally weighted standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns experienced by the bidder during (-5,-1-5) time window surrounding the 
announcement dates of the previous acquisition attempts (i.e. PCAR_1 is the 
standardized cumulative abnormal returns of the bidder surrounding the 
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announcement date of the previous acquisition attempt and PCAR_3 refers to the 
standardized cumulative returns surrounding the announcement date of the 3rd lag 
deal attempt by the same bidder). The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were 
estimated using the single factor market model for each firm in the sample using 252 
daily returns starting 10 days prior to respective acquisition announcement date. The 
CRSP-value weight and equally weighted indices were used as market indices in the 
market model estimation. Accordingly, the abnormal returns for each firm-event 
combination were estimated the as the prediction error of the single factor market 
model. CARs were estimated by accumulating daily abnormal returns over the event 
windows (-10,0), (-5,+5), and (-2,+2) around the announcement date (event date). 
9- Industry Relative Performance (Ret - RVW-IND)'- this is the industry adjusted return of 
the bidder's stock during the 1-year period before the acquisition attempt/transaction. 
Industry returns are calculated using a value-weighted approach. I adopted Fama-
French's 48 industrial classifications to classify bidders into different industries and 
computing industry-level value weighted returns. 
10-M&A Success History (Loss_Reactionj, Loss_Reaction2, and Loss_Reactionf): 
Loss_Reactioni is a dummy variable that takes a value of (1) if the previous 
acquisition attempt/transaction (first lag) by the bidder was uncompleted and (0) if 
otherwise. Loss_Reaction2 is a dummy variable that takes a value of (1) if the second 
lagged attempt/transaction was uncompleted by the bidder and (0) if otherwise. 
Loss_Reaction3 is a dummy variable that takes a value of (1) if the third lagged 
attempt/transaction was uncompleted by the bidder and (0) if otherwise. 
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11-Change in Management Compensation (CHG-Total Mgt Compensation, CHG-Top 
Exec. Comp., CHG-Cash Comp. of Top Executive, CHG-Non-Cash Comp. of Top 
Executive, CHG-Cash Comp. of Mgt Team, and CHG-Non-Cash Comp. of Mgt 
Team): These variables are estimated using data obtained from the ExecuComp 
database and they capture the annual change in management compensation reported 
in the fiscal year preceding the acquisition transaction. The "Change in total 
management compensation" variable measures the change in both cash and non-cash 
compensation combined for the top 5 executives while the CHG-Top Exec. Comp. 
estimates the annual change in the cash and non-cash compensation of the top 
executive in the company. CHG-Cash Comp. of Top Executive and CHG-Non-Cash 
Comp. of Top Executive capture cash and non-cash changes in the compensation 
package of the lead executive and the two remaining variables capture the cash and 
non-cash compensation changes combined for the second-to-fifth highest ranking 
executives in the company. The cash compensation refers primarily to salary and 
bonus paid to management in addition to other cash payments including severance 
payments, debt forgiveness, payouts for cancellation of stock options, 401K 
contributions, signing bonuses...etc. Non-cash compensation include stock and 
options awards and other non-cash perks and benefits. 
Control Variables: 
12-Ret (Price Run-up): is the 1-year run-up or price appreciation in the bidder's stock 
prior to the transaction. 
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13-Mkt-Cap: is the log of the bidder's market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the acquisition attempt/transaction (End of year price * Shares outstanding 
at year-end). 
14-MB (Tobin's Q): is the market-to-book value calculated as the market value of equity 
plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of equity plus book value of 
debt [(MV of Equity + BV of Debt) / (BV of Equity + BV of Debt)] at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding the acquisition attempt/transaction. 
15-Leverage: this is the total liabilities to assets ratio at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding a transaction. 
16-FCF: Free-Cash-Flow, operating cash flow by the firm at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding to the transaction net of all capital expense requirements. 
17-Intangibles/Assets: the ratio of intangible assets divided by total assets of the 
company at the end of the preceding fiscal year. 
18-NIB EX: is the net income before extra ordinary items of the bidder at the end of the 
preceding fiscal year to the transaction. 
19- Relative size: similar to the definition stated in point 5 above. 
20-Insider Ownership: this is the ratio of all vested shares owned and by the top five 
executives in the company to outstanding shares at the end of the preceding fiscal 
year to the transaction. 
21-Cash Compensation Ratio: this variable captures the compensation structure of the 
bidder's management team. It is calculated as the ratio of cash-to-total compensation 
received by the management team. 
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[ Insert Table 2 here] 
[ Insert Table 3 here] 
Summary statistics and Pearson correlations for the main data set variables are 
summarized in tables 2 and 3. In table 2, the summary statistics are reported for the whole 
sample as well as a sub-sample which excluded banks and utilities. The median premium 
paid by bidders in acquisition attempts/transactions in the full sample and the sub-sample 
excluding banks and utilities is 26.9% and 27.3% respectively. Similarly, median market 
capitalization of firms in the two samples is 407.9 and 381.3 million respectively. Raw 
returns (price run-up) of bidders during the fiscal year preceding the acquisition 
attempt/transaction were on average 22.9% and 22.5% over the two samples while 
industry adjusted returns were 4.1% and 4.5%. Median leverage, intangible assets ratio, 
relative size and insider ownership were almost identical across both samples around 
20%, 6.5%, 8.7%, and 0.7% respectively. The mean (median) deal values for the full 
sample were $ 275.1 million ($27.3 million) while for the sub-sample excluding banks 
and utilities deal values were on average $ 255 million ($ 25.3 million) respectively. 
The majority of targets in the sample are non-public (80.3% and 83.3% in the full 
sample and sub-sample excluding banks and utilities respectively) , local (87.3% and 
85.8% in the full sample and sub sample excluding banks and utilities respectively), and 
operating in unrelated industries to the bidder (89.5% and 89.7% in the full sample and 
sub sample excluding banks and utilities respectively). 
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3.3 METHODOLOGY: REGRESSION MODELS 
3.3.1 Testing Target Choice Variables: 
I estimated various maximum likelihood probit regression models with various 
specifications to gauge the impact of various loss/performance proxies on the choices 
made by bidders regarding prospective targets, namely, whether targets are Public/Non-
Public, Local/Foreign, and operated in Related/Unrelated industries (i.e. diversifying 
acquisitions). The basic model estimated is as follows: 
Target Choices = a + Pi Market Feedback + P2 M&A Success History + ^Relative 
Industry P erf or. + ^ 4 A Mgt Compensation + ps A Bidder Performance + fi(,Firm Level 
Controls +S (1) 
Given that some of these choice variables may be interlinked and therefore 
inferences regarding bidders reaction to previous losses may be unclear if bidders make 
opposing target choices from a risk perspective. For example, if a bidder react to previous 
losses by selecting a public target in un-related industry, then it would be difficult to infer 
whether this represents a risk seeking or risk avoiding behavior as compared to a bidder 
selecting a private target in a related industry. As such, I created several sub-samples to 
test target choice variables while controlling for other target choices/decisions. For 
example, model 1 is regressed to explain the bidder's choice of public versus non-public 
targets where all targets in this subsample are local targets in related industries to that of 
the bidder. The results of these regressions are reported for 8 subsamples reflecting the 
various possible target choice combinations. 
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It is important to note that various bidder specific variables are significantly 
correlated which may bias estimates and standard errors necessary to draw statistical 
inferences to test the formulated hypotheses. Therefore, I estimated another version of the 
previous model following Masulis et al (2007) by substituting industry median variables 
using Fama-French 48 industrial classification for bidder specific variables with strong 
correlations. This version of the model is estimated using probit maximum likelihood 
regressions as follows: 
Target Choices = a + pi Market Feedback + P2 M&A Success History + ^Relative 
Industry Performance + $4 A Mgt Compensation + $5 A Bidder Performance + $eFF-
Industry Median Bidder Characteristics + frOther Firm Level Controls + s (2) 
3.3.2 Testing Relative Size, Closing Time, and Intra-deal Period variables 
I ran a number of simple OLS regressions of a similar to model 1 where the 
dependent variable is substituted by target-to-bidder Relative size, close period of the 
deal, and the time period elapsing between consecutive deals. The following are the 
models estimated: 
Relative Size = a + Pi Market Feedback + P2 M&A Success History + ^Relative Industry 
Performance + $4 A Mgt Comp. + fc A Bidder Performance + faFirm Level Controls + s 
(3) 
Period Close/Intra-Deal Period = a + pi Market Feedback + p2 M&A Success History + 
^Relative Industry Performance + §4 A Mgt Comp. + ^5 A Bidder Performance + foFirm 
Level Controls + £ (4) 
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3.3.3 Testing Premiums paid by bidders: 
Initially, simple OLS regressions are estimated to explain premiums paid by 
bidders similar to model 1 as shown in model 5-1. In addition, model 5-2 represents an 
OLS regression model estimated for premiums paid by bidders including Fama-French 
industry medians data in a similar fashion to model 2 discussed above. 
Premium = a + Pi Market Feedback + P2 M&A Success History + ^Relative Industry 
Performance + $4 A Mgt Comp. + P5 A Bidder Performance + $(,Firm Level Controls + s 
(5-1) 
Premium = a + pi Market Feedback + P2 M&A Success History + ^Relative Industry 
Performance + $4 A Mgt Compensation + $5 A Bidder Performance + faFF-Industry 
Median Bidder Characteristics + %Other Firm Level Controls + s (5-2) 
Given that target choice variables have often been used in literature to partially 
explain premiums paid, their introduction into the premium regressions is warranted (for 
example, premiums paid for public targets are expected to be significantly different from 
those of non-public targets). However, introducing these variables into the regression 
along with various loss proxies will cause an endogeneity problem. Shaver (1998) built 
upon earlier work done by Heckman (1979) to propose a 2-stage Probit-OLS model with 
endogeneity correction. I follow Shaver's solution by initially running simple maximum 
likelihood probit regressions for the Target Choice Variables (Public, Related, and Local) 
similar to model 1 and compute the inverse-mill's ratio (defined as the ratio of probability 
density function to the cumulative distribution function). The inverse-mill's ratio 
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estimation when a target choice variable takes value of 1 and 0 in the maximum 
likelihood probit regression is as follows: 
d>(y'w) —0(y'w) 
X= — if target dummy= 1, and X= T =• if target dummy=0. (6) 
®(?w) [l-0(/w)] 
Accordingly, premium OLS models are ran including target choice variables 
along with the respective endogeneity correction term (lambda). The following three 
models estimate premiums controlling for the various target choice variables. 
Premium = a + Pi Market Feedback + p2 M&A Success History + ^Relative Industry 
Performance + P4 A Mgt Comp. + P5 A Bidder Performance + ^^Firm Level Controls + P7 
Public Target + Ps ^Public Target + £ (6-1) 
Premium = a + Pi Market Feedback + P2 M&A Success History + ^Relative Industry 
Performance + $4 A Mgt Comp. + ^5 A Bidder Performance + foFirm Level Controls + P7 
Local Target + Pg XLocai Target + £ (6-2) 
Premium = a + Pi Market Feedback + P2 M&A Success History + ^Relative Industry 
Performance + §4 A Mgt Comp. + $5 A Bidder Performance + foFirm Level Controls + P7 
Related Target + Pg Abated Target + £ (6-3) 
Similarly, target-to-bidder relative size has often been reported in literature to 
partially explain premiums paid. As such, I estimated a 2-stage least squares model 
(2SLS) which adopted an IV approach to explain premiums incorporating relative size 
and accounting for potential endogeneity issues with' target choice variables as show in 
model 7. 
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Premium = a + Pi Market Feedback + P2 M&A Success History + ^ Relative Industry 
Performance + P4 A Mgt Comp. + $5 A Bidder Performance + $(,Firm Level Controls + P7 
Relative Size + s (7) 
Given the potential impact of changes in management compensation, another 
model using only changes in management variables is estimated to explain premiums 
paid by bidders. Two versions of this model are estimated including a firm level data 
version and Fama-French industry medians data version similar to models 5-1 and 5-2. 
The estimated models are as follows: 
Premium = a + Pi A Cash Comp. of Top Exec. + P2 A Non-cash Comp. of Top Exec. + 
faACash Comp. of Other Mgt + p4 A Non-cash Comp. of Other Mgt + fisFirm Level 
Controls + s (8-1) 
Premium = a + pi A Cash Comp. of Top Exec. + P2 A Non-cash Comp. of Top Exec. + 
foACash Comp. of Other Mgt + $4 A Non-cash Comp. of Other Mgt + fisFF-Industry 
Median Bidder Characteristics + %Firm Level Controls + s (8-2) 
3.3.4 Robustness Checks: 
Several models are estimated to explain various M&A variables under study over 
various sub-samples. I employed several proxies for key variables including premiums 
paid by bidders and management compensation. In addition, further robustness 
regressions were ran for subsamples resulting from sorting the data by key variables to 
check for managerial entrenchment (ownership), sample sub-periods, and managerial 
overconfidence (3 approached were employed). 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 TARGET CHOICES AND ACQUISITION BEHAVIOR 
Table (4) summarizes the results of the maximum likelihood probit regressions to 
explain the bidder's choice of public/non-public targets. Panels A, B and C report various 
specifications of model 1 over 4 subsamples including (i) the full sample, (ii) subsample 
excluding banks and utilities (iii) bidders without uncompleted deals and (iv) bidders 
with uncompleted deals. It should be pointed out that bidders are classified into 
subsample (iii) if they have not experienced an uncompleted deal previously and 
otherwise bidders are classified in sample (iv). As such, M&A Success History variables 
are not reported to subsample (iii). 
[Insert table 4 here] 
In panel A, bidders generally have a negative significant relationship between 
choosing a public target and the lagged standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CARs) of previous attempts/transactions, namely, the first and third lags. This negative 
relationship is significant at 1% confidence level across various subsamples. This 
suggests that negative market reactions surrounding the announcement dates of earlier 
acquisition attempts/transactions increase the likelihood of bidders choosing public 
targets in later acquisition attempts. A similar result is observed by looking at the results 
of the M&A Success history variables (Loss_Reactioni, Loss_Reaction2, and 
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Loss_Reaction3). The positive significant estimates of the three lags for the full sample 
and the subsample excluding banks and utilities suggest that bidders with an earlier 
uncompleted/failed acquisition attempt tend to choose public targets in following bids. 
An opposite result is provided by the relative bidder to industry performance (Ret - RVW-
IND)- However, the magnitude of this relationship is smaller compared to the other loss 
proxies. It can be noted that CHG-NIBEX variable is insignificant. Panel B substitutes 
the Change in top executive compensation (CHG-Top Exec. Comp.) for change in 
bidder's NIB EX, however, has insignificant relationship with the Public dependent 
variable while lagged market reaction variables and M&A success history variables have 
a similar result as reported in Panel A. 
Panel C introduces additional control variables into the probit specification, 
namely, the ratio of cash compensation to total compensation received by bidder's 
management as well as level of insider ownership. The relationship between market 
reaction variables and M&A success history variables is generally similar to that reported 
in Panel A, albeit with lower level of significance. In addition, all loss proxies seem to 
loss their significance in the subsample (iv). 
Table (5) summarizes the results of the maximum likelihood probit regressions to 
explain the bidder's choice of related/unrelated targets. Panels A, B and C report various 
specifications of model 1 over 4 subsamples similar to those reported in table (4) 
including (i) the full sample, (ii) subsample excluding banks and utilities (iii) bidders 
without uncompleted deals and (iv) bidders with uncompleted deals. 
[Insert table 6 here] 
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In panel A, the 2n and 3r estimates of the market reaction lagged CARs are 
significantly positively related with the dependent dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 if the target operates in a related industry to that of the bidder (the 3rd lag is 
marginally significant at 15% confidence level with a chi-square value of 2.123). This 
observation persists over the subsamples which exclude banks and utilities as well as in 
which bidders experienced earlier uncompleted acquisition attempts (the estimates are 
also of higher absolute value and enjoy higher level of significance). The direction of the 
estimates suggests that losses, in terms of a negative market reaction, increase the 
likelihood of choosing an unrelated target. The estimates of the M&A Success history 
lagged dummies are positive and strongly significant with the target's related dummy 
variable over the whole sample and the subsample excluding banks and utilities. The 
estimates of the three loss reaction variables are 0.256, 0.235 and 0.221 respectively (the 
first two lags are significant at 1% and the third lag is significant at 5%) and therefore 
have the largest impact or target's choice related to all other variables in the model except 
for the leverage level of the bidder. This suggests that experiencing a previous 
uncompleted deal increases the likelihood that the bidder may choose a target in a related 
industry. An interesting observation is that these lags lose their significance in the 
subsample including bidders with previous uncompleted deals which may suggest that 
bidders who experienced previous uncompleted deals are less sensitive to such incidents 
compared to bidders without any uncompleted bids. 
The relative firm-industry performance (Ret - RVW-IND) is positively related with 
the related target dummy suggesting a similar inference noted earlier in relation to market 
52 
reaction lagged CARs. However, M&A success history are stronger in terms of 
magnitude compared to the lagged CARs and relative firm-industry performance. 
Panel B reports the results of another specification by substituting change in 
management compensation proxy for CHG-NIBEX variable. The change in management 
compensation is significantly positively related to the related target dummy only at 10% 
in the subsample including bidders with previously uncompleted acquisition 
attempts/transactions. This result suggests that cuts in managerial compensation increases 
the likelihood for bidders choosing unrelated targets. The same observation made earlier 
can be pointed again, the M&A Success history has a larger impact than other loss 
proxies included in the regression. It is also interesting to note that leverage has a sizable 
significantly positive relation with this choice variable suggesting that bidders with 
higher level of debt are more likely to choose related targets. This appears to be in line 
with Jensen (1986) assertion that debt limits the freedom of managers in using free cash 
flow of the firm to pursue sub-optimal projects and thus reduce agency issues. In panel C, 
the results of an expanded specification of the model are reported including all loss 
proxies and control variables. While the lagged market reaction CARs lose significance, 
the earlier observations made in panel B regarding the M&A history success and change 
in management compensation persist. Overall, the regressions reported in table 5 show 
that market reaction lagged CARs and management compensation change suggest that 
losses (negative changes) increase the likelihood of bidders picking unrelated targets, 
however, the M&A success history dummies have opposite and more sizable 
interpretation. This suggests that corporate failure events such as inability to close an 
acquisition deal have a strong effect on following choices, albeit, infrequent. In the 
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absence of such events, other proxies of loss seems to increase the likelihood of choosing 
unrelated targets. 
Table (6) summarizes the results of the maximum likelihood probit regressions to 
explain the bidder's choice of local/foreign targets. Panels A, B and C report various 
specifications of model 1 over 4 subsamples similar to those reported in tables (4 & 5) 
including (i) the full sample, (ii) subsample excluding banks and utilities (iii) bidders 
without uncompleted deals and (iv) bidders with uncompleted deals. 
[Insert table 6 here] 
Unlike tables 4 & 5, table 6 reports weaker representation of the relationship 
between the various loss proxies and the local/foreign target dummy variable. In panel A, 
only the 3rd lagged M&A Success history is significant negatively related to the 
dependent variable over all subsamples with all other proxies appearing to be 
insignificant. In panels B & C the 2nd lagged market reaction CAR estimate is 
significantly negative in the whole sample at 5% and in the subsample including bidders 
without uncompleted deals at 10% while other proxies, including M&A success history 
lags, are insignificant. This suggests that experiencing losses in terms of negative market 
reaction as measure by lagged CARs may increase the likelihood of bidders to pick local 
targets in following attempts. 
Table (7) summarizes the results of the maximum likelihood probit regressions to 
explain the bidder's choice of Public/Non-Public and Related/Unrelated targets over 8 
subsamples representing all sub-sampling possibilities of the full sample by three factors; 
targets being foreign/local, related/unrelated & public/private (2 x 2 x 2). For the purpose 
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of further discussion, it seems logical that bidders will not make all decisions regarding 
the target's nature concurrently and as such some decisions may precede others. In other 
words, bidders have to make earlier decisions regarding the strategic direction of the 
company in terms of venturing into a new industry or pursuing a foreign expansion. 
Therefore, it is likely that choosing a public/private target would follow deciding on 
related/unrelated and local/foreign target choices. As such, I shall focus on sub-samples 
1, 2, 5, and 6. 
[Insert table 7 here] 
Looking at the M&A success history variables we can observe that various lags 
have positive significant coefficients in sub-samples 1, 2 and 5 suggesting that previous 
uncompleted acquisition attempts increase the likelihood of the bidder picking a public 
target in subsequent attempts in case of local targets, whether related or unrelated, and 
foreign related targets. Market reaction lagged CARs are only positively significant in 
subsample 5 at 1% and change in managerial compensation has a positive significant 
coefficient in subsamples 1 and 6. This suggests that managers experiencing losses in 
terms of negative market reactions (CARs) in previous deals or compensation cuts are 
likely to pick private targets regardless of the target being local/foreign and operating in a 
related/unrelated industry. Similar to the observation made previously, managers seem to 
respond differently to financial loss in terms of market reaction and compensation change 
versus a corporate event such as failing to complete previous bids. Corporate events tend 
to induce a safe betting tendency in picking public and related targets while market 
reaction and compensation change induce a risk taking behavior. 
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Other observations that are worth noting include that Tobin's Q - which may be 
assumed to signify growth opportunities (Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1996) or mispricing 
(Dong, et al., 2006; Harford, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003) - bidder's price run-up, 
compensation structure and insider's ownership seem to have little impact on any of key 
categorical choices that bidders make regarding their prospective targets. However, 
leverage and intangibles have significant and consistent impact on the bidder's choices of 
related/unrelated and public/private targets in the local targets subsample. This again 
supports the agency theory's assertions regarding managerial behavior in corporate 
takeovers in a local acquisition setting as well as the decision to pursue international 
expansion, however, have no impact on further decisions regarding the target's nature 
once the bidder decided to move abroad. 
Table 8 reports regressions including loss proxies proposed in this study and finds 
a significant impact on relative size of target to bidder and a similar pattern is observed to 
bidder's behavior in previous tables. 
[Insert table 8 here] 
The lagged market reaction variables are significantly positively related to target 
size suggesting a loss in terms of negative market reaction will have a negative effect on 
the relative size of the target. The M&A success history is significantly positively related 
to the relative size variable (with larger magnitude) suggesting that the bidders 
experiencing uncompleted lagged attempts tend to go for higher relative size targets in 
consecutive bids. Given the significant results reported in table 8, premium regressions 
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reported in following tables will account for the relationship between the adopted loss 
proxies and relative size. 
Table 9 reports OLS regressions investigating the impact of proposed loss proxies 
and control variables on the time taken by bidders to close a deal and to move from one 
deal to another. The results are reported using 2 model specifications over 4 samples 
including (i) the full sample, (ii) subsample excluding banks and utilities (iii) bidders 
without uncompleted deals and (iv) bidders with uncompleted deals. 
[Insert table 9 here] 
In terms of time taken by bidders to close a deal, the M&A success history lags 
and relative bidder-to-industry stock return seem to be significantly positively related to 
the time variable. This suggests that in the absence of a previously uncompleted deals, a 
loss in terms of poor performance relative to company's industry peers may induce the 
bidder to close deals faster. However, if the bidder experienced previously an 
uncompleted/failed deal, this significantly increase the time taken by the bidder to close 
deal. Other interesting results include that higher leverage levels and market 
capitalization of the bidder are associated with longer periods to close a deal. This may 
suggest that higher leverage levels impose constraints on bidders and force them to 
consider further deal implications. 
In regards to the time period between two consecutive deals, a similar outcome is 
observed by the loss proxies, previous uncompleted deals or managerial compensation 
cuts increase the time period taken by bidders to embark on the following bid while 
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negative market reaction lagged CARs and relative bidder-industry performance induces 
bidders to embark on the following acquisition attempts in a quicker fashion. 
4.2 PREMIUMS PAID BY BIDDERS FOR TARGETS 
Table 10 reports simple premium OLS regressions carried out over 4 subsamples 
(whole sample, excluding banks & utilities, bidders without uncompleted deals, and 
bidders with uncompleted deals) using 4 proxies for premiums paid by bidders in M&A 
attempts/transactions, namely, (i) 1-day premium, (ii) 1-week premium, (iii) 4-weeks 
premium, and (iv) deal-asset ratio. 
[Insert table 10 here] 
Panel A reports a positive significant relationship between M&A success history 
lagged dummies premiums paid. In panel B, market reaction lagged CARs appear to have 
a positive significant relationship with premiums paid by bidders particularly at the first 
lag (3 out of 4 subsamples) and to a lesser extent at the second lag (2 out of 4 
subsamples) while lagged M&A success dummies lose significance. In panel C, M&A 
success history have positive significant relationship with premiums particularly when 
banks and utilities are excluded from the sample and in the subsample including bidders 
with previous uncompleted deals. This is consistent with the relative bidder-industry 
performance variable, in case of a significant negative coefficient, suggesting losses in 
terms of negative relative bidder-industry performance is associated with higher 
premiums. This observation goes opposite to the market reaction lagged CARs over the 
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sub-sample including only bidders with uncompleted deals. This suggests that bidders 
faring poorly from a market perspective tend to pay lower premiums unless they 
experience a previous failed/uncompleted transaction. It should be pointed out that 
change in management compensation had mixed results reported in this table which may 
be attributed to its nature as all encompassing compensation proxy (including both cash 
and non-cash compensation which may have opposite impacts on premiums paid). Over 
all, important missing variables which may help better explain premiums include the 
choice variables regarding the target which will be addressed in the following table along 
with controlling for resulting endogeneity. Tables 11 and 12 shed more light on the 
impact of the explanatory variables used to explain premiums paid by bidders while 
controlling for potential endogeneity with the target choice variables and relative size in 
addition to dissecting the change in managerial compensation variable to investigate 
whether managerial compensation loss has an impact on premiums paid or not. 
Table 11 reports premium regressions using a 2-stage Probit-OLS regressions to 
control for endogeneity resulting from the introduction of target choice variables into 
premium regression models in addition to a 2 Stage Least Squares (2SLS) to account for 
the endogeneity resulting from introducing relative size into premium regressions. 
[Insert table 11 here] 
Panel A reports the premium regression results while controlling for the target's 
nature of being public/non-public and local/foreign while panel B reports results for 
premium regression controlling for target being related/unrelated and the target-bidder 
relative size. A number of observations should be pointed out, first, market reaction 
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lagged CARs have a negative correlation with premiums paid by bidders in the 1st and 3r 
lags while having a positive estimate at the 2" lag which suggests that initial negative 
market reactions increase premiums paid by bidders initially then a reversal takes place in 
following transactions. Second, relative bidder-industry performance seems not to be 
robust across various model specifications, however, takes a negative significant , albeit 
small in magnitude, relationship with premiums when controlling for target-bidder 
relative size suggesting poor relative performance to be correlated with subsequent higher 
premiums. Third, M&A success history variables have a positive significant, mostly 
consistent, relationship with premiums paid by bidders particularly in case of the 1st and 
2nd lags. Forth, changes in management compensation does not seem to have an impact 
on premiums paid by bidders (this shall be investigated in greater detail in table 12). 
Overall, results of table 11 suggest that previous losses in terms of negative market 
reaction and/or failed acquisition attempts induce bidders to overpay during following 
bids. 
Table 12 reports premium OLS-regressions using managerial compensation 
changes as proxy for loss. There are three key motivations behind carrying out these 
regressions; first, to check whether other loss proxies may have masked the effect of 
compensation changes since compensation changes may be passed by shareholders and 
the board of directors following events of corporate loss, failed acquisition attempts 
and/or poor relative industry performance. Second, the change in total compensation 
variable used in previous regressions lump both cash and non-cash compensation 
(including options and stock grants) paid to management which may have opposite 
effects on the risk attitude of management. Harford and Li (2007) found that management 
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tend to become insensitive to stock performance after mergers, this may suggest that 
decoupling cash and non-cash stock based compensation (stocks and options) may have 
different impact on management response. Third, compensation changes experienced by 
company's top executive (CEO, Chairman, President..etc) may have a very different 
impact on their decision making compared to compensation paid to the rest of the 
management team which may or may not be equally involved in the acquisition 
decisions. As such, the change in managerial compensation is dissected into 4 variables, 
namely (i) percentage change in the cash compensation of the top executive, (ii) 
percentage change in the non-cash compensation of the top executive, (iii) percentage 
change in the cash compensation of other management team members, and (iv) 
percentage change in the cash compensation of other management team members. 
[Insert table 12 here] 
Table 12 include regressions using 3 different proxies for premiums paid by 
bidders (1-day premium, 1-week premium, and 4-weeks premium) and include two 
versions of the regression model using both company level data and Fama-French 
industry medians data. The later version is meant to control for potential colliniarity of 
the explanatory variables especially firm characteristics variables. A number of important 
outcomes can be pointed out, first, changes in the cash compensation of the top executive 
and remaining management team has a significantly negative impact on premiums paid 
by bidders. Second, non-cash compensation changes of the top executive has a negative 
insignificant relationship with premiums paid by bidders. Third, changes in non-cash 
compensation of the remaining management team has a significant positive effect on 
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premiums paid, however, smaller in magnitude relative to changes in cash compensation 
changes to management team. Forth, these results seem to be consistent whether firm 
level data or Fama-French industry medians were used and robust particularly on the 1-
day premium proxy. Fifth, I ran separate regressions including changes in management 
compensations variables -unreported results- to explain target choices, (public, related 
and local), however, I was unable to find an impact of changes in compensation whether 
cash or non-cash on target choices that bidders make and therefore couldn't support the 
argument that incorporating stock options and other non-cash compensation elements in 
managerial compensation package would adjust the risk taking attitude of managers 
towards a more optimal level (Williams & Rao, 2006). Other observations which may be 
pointed out include the positive significant relationship between the bidder's MB ratio 
with premiums paid consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (2003) mispricing hypothesis on 
firm level and using industry wide proxies (Harford, 2005). 
4.3 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The following section summarizes robustness checks for regression results for the 
target choice variables and premiums paid by bidders. A number of influential studies 
looked at the impact/relationship of direct stock ownership by management on agency 
issues, market responses to insider trading, corporate decisions and corporate governance 
mechanism in their respective companies (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997; Fidrmuc, 
Goergen, & Renneboog, 2006; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In regressions reported 
earlier, the introduction of insider ownership often affected the significance of the loss 
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proxy variables. As such, I sorted the sample by percentage of stock directly owned by 
management relative to outstanding shares and formed two subsamples representing the 
top and bottom quartiles. The maximum likelihood probit and premium OLS regressions 
are reported for both sub-samples to illustrate any possible effect managerial ownership 
may have on previously reported results. Table 13 provides summary statistics of the key 
variables of both subsamples. 
[Insert table 13 here] 
Table 14 reports the regression results observed over the two entrenchment 
subsamples. The table summarizes probit and OLS regressions for target choice variables 
and premiums paid by bidders using two model specifications over both subsamples. 
[Insert table 14 here] 
A number of observations can be made in the high entrenchment sub-sample. 
First, the relationship between M&A Success history lags have negative significant 
relationship on public/private and related/unrelated targets whereby previous 
uncompleted deals will increase the likelihood of the bidder choosing a private and 
unrelated targets. This goes against the results found earlier under moderate levels of 
insider ownership. Second, managers with high ownership in their companies seem to be 
insensitive to previous losses in regards to the premium paid by their firms for new 
targets. Third, in the low entrenchment subsample, M&A success history has a positive 
relation with premiums paid by bidders. Forth, loss and uncompleted earlier deal proxies 
have largely no impact on premiums paid in the higher entrenchment subsample. 
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Recent studies in the area of behavioral finance looking at the overconfidence 
concept and documented its impact on corporate investment decisions taken by the firm. 
Proxies for overconfidence including number of acquisitions undertaken and in-the-
money exercisable options held by management which are not exercised for an extended 
period (Doukas & Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a). The logic that can be 
derived from examining overconfident managers is that they will attempt to make risky 
decisions given that they exaggerate their personal abilities and ignore market signals. I 
sorted the sample according to three different overconfidence proxies (number of deals 
conducted by the bidder, log of the dollar value of in-the-money exercisable options held 
by management, and ratio of total exercisable options held by management to total 
outstanding stocks). Upon sorting the sample by each overconfidence proxy, I formed 6 
subsamples representing top and bottom quartiles by various overconfidence proxies. 
Table 15 shows the summary statistics of key variables over the 6 subsamples. 
[Insert table 15 here] 
Probit regressions for target choice variables and OLS regressions results are 
reported for the 6 subsamples in table 16. 
[Insert table 16 here] 
The results reported in Panel A refer to overconfident managers identified by 
bidders conducting 13 or more acquisition attempts/transactions. Higher level of 
overconfidence seems to decrease the bidder's sensitivity of M&A Success History, 
however, the 2nd lag of uncompleted transaction still has a positive significant relation 
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with the related/unrelated target choice. Changes in management compensation variable 
points that bidders following a loss tend to choose private and unrelated targets, however, 
increases the likelihood of paying lower premiums. M&A success history variables seem 
to produce the same result regarding bidder's choosing related/unrelated target in the high 
overconfidence subsample in panel B using value of in-the-money options held by 
management. In panel C, losses measured by market reaction lagged CARs and M&A 
success history factors increases the likelihood of bidders choosing public and related 
targets respectively while measures are conflicting for local/foreign dummy variable. In 
addition, none of the loss proxies seem to have an impact on premiums paid by bidders. 
In general, higher level of overconfidence tends to break the relationship between losses 
and premiums paid. 
Another set of regressions are conducted to check the relationship between the 
proposed loss proxies and target choice variables and premiums paid by bidders over 
various sub periods of the full sample. Earlier research suggests that mergers waves 
which may be caused by industrial and/or market shocks often taking place and can have 
a significant impact on the attributes of the deals (Harford, 2005). In addition, some 
clustering seem to be present in the sample in few industrial sectors which may raise the 
potential of industry wide effects being present and affecting variables tested in the 
current study. Accordingly as discussed in the methodology chapter, I estimated all probit 
and regression models using industry median variables previous model following Masulis 
et al (2007) by substituting Fama-French 48 industry medians data variables instead of 
firm level data over full sample and 3-subperiods. Table 17 provides summary statistics 
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for key variables over the 3 sub-periods. A side benefit of this approach is to control for 
any possible colliniarity among the explanatory variables. 
[Insert table 17 here] 
Table 18 summarizes the regressions results over the three sub-samples a long 
with the full sample. These results can be taken to test the results reported earlier while 
controlling for time period and industry level factors. 
[Insert table 18 here] 
In general, the overall directional relationship between the various loss proxies 
and target choice variables and premium which were reported in previous tables are 
maintained across various subsamples. However, significance of the M&A success 
history variables seem to diminish in the last subsample (2001-2005), nevertheless, 
market reaction lagged CARs and relative bidder-industry return are still significant. 
Further, the results are robust to the use of Fama-French industries data. Further, 
controlling for industry shocks, management compensation changes is significantly 
positively related to target choice variables. This suggests that, losses in terms of 
management compensation increases the bidder's likelihood of picking private, foreign 
and unrelated targets. 
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION 
The research agenda of this study aimed at introducing the concept of loss 
aversion advanced as the center piece of the prospect theory proposed by Kahneman & 
Tversky. The key idea proposed by the theory is that economic agents derive utility from 
changes in wealth as opposed to total level of wealth, in other words, gains and losses are 
carriers of utility and as such have an impact on post gain/loss risk aversion. The 
empirical study conducted introduced various loss proxies including firm, market, track 
record, industry, and managerial compensation based. In general, results reported suggest 
that firm based events of loss seem to be qualitative in nature and illicit different 
reactions by bidders as compared to the other loss proxies. A number of key results may 
be pointed out, first, management teams of bidding companies subject to losses in terms 
of market and industry feedback tend to be more risk taking in terms of choosing to 
acquire unrelated, private targets and relatively smaller. 
Second, events of corporate loss such as failing to complete a previous merger 
attempt tend to increase the likelihood of bidders playing it safe by choosing targets that 
are publicly listed, in related industries, and with higher relative size to the bidder. The 
impact of such corporate loss events is larger in absolute terms, albeit, infrequent. This 
suggests that bidders failing to complete previous bids tend to make safer bets in 
following attempts by choosing targets in related industries which the bidder is familiar 
with and publically listed, as such, making it easier for bidders to check the targets 
performance due to decreasing information asymmetry. 
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Third, management teams experiencing previous losses in terms of failed merger 
attempts, lower return relative to industry rivals and compensation cuts tend to overpay 
for targets in subsequent bids. The relationship between compensation loss and 
overpayment is primarily related to changes in salary and bonus. Non cash compensation 
losses by the top executive have a positive insignificant impact on premiums paid by 
bidders while non cash compensation losses by the other management team tend to 
decrease premiums, however, has a small absolute impact on premiums related to other 
compensation loss proxies. 
Forth, when controlling for various target choice decisions, compensation loss 
tends to increase the likelihood of choosing a private target regardless whether this target 
is local/foreign or operated in a related/unrelated industry. Fifth, when insider ownership 
increases, proxies of corporate loss events (i.e. M&A success history) give opposite 
results suggesting that a previously unsuccessful merger attempt increases the likelihood 
of the bidder choosing private and unrelated targets. This suggests that as managerial 
stock ownership increases, corporate events of loss such as failed merger attempts tend to 
illicit the same reactions from the management team of the company as may be induced 
by a compensation loss. Sixth, managers characterized by higher levels of overconfidence 
tend to make riskier choices in terms of choosing unrelated targets and private targets 
after suffering compensation losses. The main results reported earlier are robust to 
overconfidence using number of acquisitions and ratio of stock options held by 
management as proxies but tend to lose significance using the absolute value of options 
held by managers. Finally, results are robust to controlling for endogeneity, industry wide 
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factors and across time subsamples, however, the significance of M&A success history 
factors diminish over the 2001 - 2005 period while other proxies retain their significance. 
The results provide support to the agency theory propositions especially in terms 
of explaining bidder's target choices. Other factors including Tobin's Q, profitability, 
insider ownership and compensation structure seem to have little effect on such choices. 
In addition, the mispricing theory has significant explanatory power in relation to 
premiums paid by bidders. 
The results in general tend to support the propositions of the prospect theory, 
losses induce subsequent risk taking, in terms of target choice variables and premium 
paid especially using market, industry and management compensation proxies. Corporate 
loss events tend to illicit an opposite reaction. Bidders tend to play safe after failing to 
complete an acquisition in terms of target choice variables (public/private and 
related/unrelated). This supports the quasi-hedonic proposition. However, as insiders 
ownership increases, management reaction to corporate loss events tend to mimic their 
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Figure 1: Building Blocks of Behavioral Finance Literature"1 
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Figure 2: S-Shaped Utility Function 
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Figure 3: Impact of Prior Performance on the S-Shaped Utility Curve 
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TABLE I 
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF M&A TRANSACTIONS IN U.S 1990 - 2005 
The sample consists of 16,582 M&A transactions obtained from SDC conducted by U.S bidders attempting 2 or more 
takeover transactions between 1990 and 2005. 
PANEL A: Cross Tabulation of the Sample Data 1/1/1990 - 12/31/2005 
















PANEL B: Sample Distribution by Announcement Year 
Number of Percentage of Bidder Eqt. 
Acquisitions Sample MV ($mil) 
16,582 











































































































































OBS FF OBS 
NUM IND NUM 
186 25 26 
135 26 42 
170 27 42 
47 28 17 
426 29 16 
145 30 724 
202 31 370 
















































DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF EXPLANATORY AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Descriptive statistics reported for variables divided into the whole sample and a sub sample excluding banks & 
utilities The full sample consists of 16,582 M&A transactions including 2,211 M&A transactions in the 
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Sub-Sample Excluding Banks & 




















































































































































Sub-Sample Excluding Banks & I 


































PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX 
80 
The sample consists of 16,582 M&A transactions (including 2,211 transactions in the banking and utilities sectors) conducted during the 1990 - 2005 period coveied 
by the SDC database. The dataset variables were compiled from SDC, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and ExecuComp databases. The Peaison correlations aie reported in the 
following table and p-values are reported in parentheses. 
Local 
Related 
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-0 024 0 025 
(0 76) (0 72) 
-0 124 0 086 0 117 
(0 00) (0 00) (0 00) 
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TABLE IV 
THE BIDDER'S CHOICE OF PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE TARGET IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL A: Base Model with Basic Explanatory and Control Variables 
Public = a + Pi PCAR_1 + P2PCARJ2 +^PCAR_3 + p4 Loss_Reactwn, + R5 Loss_Reaction2 + R^Loss_Reactwn3 + p7 (Ret-RvwIND) + 
RsNIBEX_CHG + p9 Ret + p i 0 MB + RU Debt/Assets + Rn Intangibles/Assets + e 
The dependent variable "Public" which takes a value of (1) in case of Publicly traded target and (0) if otherwise is regressed over four 
definitions of bidder performance in addition to price run-up of bidder's stock over 1-fiscal year period prior to the transaction's year, 
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.0 3701*1=* 






















TABLE IV - Continued 
THE BIDDER'S CHOICE OF PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE TARGET IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL B: Base Model Including Compensation Loss Proxy and Control Variables 
Public = a + Pi PCAR_1 + P2 PCARJ2 + P3 PCAR_3 + p4 Loss_Reactwn, + Q5 Loss_Reachon2 + R(,Loss_Reactwn3 + P? Change in Top 
Executive Compensation + R% Ret + P9 MB + P10 Debt/Assets + pn Intangibles/Assets + e 
The dependent variable "Public" which takes a value of (1) in case of Publicly traded target and (0) if otherwise is regressed over three 
definitions of bidder performance in addition to price run-up of bidder's stock over l-fiscal year period prioi to the transaction's year, 








CHG-Top Exec Comp 



































































































































TABLE IV - Continued 
THE BIDDER'S CHOICE OF PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE TARGET IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL C: Public Target Choice while Controlling for Insider Ownership and Management Compensation Structure 
Public = a + Pi PCARJ + ft2 PCAR_2 + p3 PCAR__3 + p4 Lossjieactionj + p5 Loss_Reaction2 + fieLoss_Reaction3 + p7 (Ret - RVW-IND) + 
B%NIBEX_CHG + Q9 Change in Top Executive Compensation + Q\oRet + Pn MB + fin MB + pn Debt/Assets + P14 Intangibles/Assets + P15 
Cash Compensation Ratio + P16 Insider Ownership + £ 
The dependent variable "Public" which takes a value of (1) in case of Publicly traded target and (0) if otherwise is regressed over four 
definitions of bidder performance in addition to price run-up of bidder's stock over 1-fiscal year period prior to the transaction's year, 
Market-to-Book ratio, Debt ratio, the ratio of intangibles to total assets, ratio of total compensation received by senior management in 
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THE BIDDER'S CHOICE OF RELATED VS. UNRELATED TARGETS IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL A: Base Model with Basic Explanatory and Control Variables 
Related = a + Pi PCAR_1 +p2PCVU?_2 + P3PCAR__3 + RAEoss_Reactwn1 + RsLoss_Reactwn2 + R(>Loss_Reactwn^ + Ri(Ret-R^iND) + 
Ps NIBEXJCHG + p9 Ret + P10 MB + ftu Debt/Assets + f>n Intangibles/Assets + £ 
The dependent variable "Related" which takes a value of (1) in case the target operates in the same industry as the biddei and (0) if 
otherwise is regressed over four definitions of bidder performance in addition to price run-up of bidder's stock over 1-fiscal year 








(Ret - Rvw IND) 
NIBEX_CHG 



















































0 0028 •=* * 
0 0000 
-0 0029*** 




















































































TABLE V - Continued 
THE BIDDER'S CHOICE OF RELATED VS. UNRELATED TARGETS IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL B: Base Model Including Compensation Loss Proxy and Control Variables 
Related = a + Pi PCAR_1 + p2 PCAR_2 + P3 PCAR_3 + P4 Lossjieaction, + p5 Loss_Reaction2 + fie Loss_Reaction3 + fij Change in Top 
Executive Compensation + fis, Ret + P9 MB + fi\o Debt/Assets + fin Intangibles/Assets + £ 
The dependent variable "Related" which takes a value of (1) in case the target operates in the same industry as the bidder and (0) if 
otherwise is regressed over three definitions of bidder performance in addition to price run-up of bidder's stock over l-fiscal year 
period prior to the transaction's year, Market-to-Book ratio, Debt ratio, and the ratio of intangibles to total assets. 
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TABLE V - Continued 
THE BIDDER'S CHOICE OF RELATED VS. UNRELATED TARGETS IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL C: Base Explanatory Including Compensation Loss Proxy and Control Variables 
Related = a + Pi PCAR_1 + p2 PCAR J. + p3 PCAR_3 + p4 Loss_Reactioni + P5 Loss_Reaction2 + fi6 Loss_Reactwn3 + fi7 (Ret - Rvw IND) + fis 
NIBEX-CHG + P9 Change in Top Executive Compensation + P10 Ret + fiu MB + P12 Debt/Assets + P13 Intangibles/Assets + P14 Cash Comp 
Ratio + P15 Insider Ownership + 8 
The dependent variable "Related" which takes a value of (1) in case the target operates in the same industry as the bidder and (0) if 
otherwise is regressed over three definitions of bidder performance in addition to price lun-up of bidder's stock ovei l-fiscal year 
period prior to the transaction's year, Market-to-Book ratio, Debt ratio, and the ratio of intangibles to total assets 
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THE BIDDER'S CHOICE OF LOCAL (U.S) Vs. FOREIGN (NON-U.S) TARGET IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL A: Base Model with Basic Explanatory and Control Variables 
Local = a + Pi PCAR_1 +fi2PCAR_2 +p3PCAR_5 + p4 Loss_Reactwn, + fi5 Loss_Reactwn2 + fi>6 Lossjieaction^ + fij (Ret - RVWIND)+ fis 
NIBEX-CHG + p9 Ret + fii0 MB + fiu Debt/Assets + fin Intangibles/Assets + £ 
The dependent variable "Local" which takes a value of (1) in case of local U S target and (0) if otherwise is regressed over four 
definitions of bidder performance in addition to price run-up of bidder's stock over 1-fiscal year period prior to the transaction's yeai, 
Market-to-Book ratio, Debt ratio, and the ratio of intangibles to total assets 
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TABLE VI - Continued 
THE BIDDER'S CHOICE OF LOCAL (U.S) Vs. FOREIGN (NON-U.S) TARGET IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL B: Base Model Including Compensation Loss Proxy and Control Variables 
Local = a + Pi PCAR_1 + fi2 PCARJ2 + p3 PCAR_3 + fit Loss_Reaction, + fis Loss_Reaction2 + fie Loss_Reaction3 + fi7 Change in Top 
Executive Compensation + fig Ret + fig MB + fiio Debt/Assets + fin Intangibles/Assets + £ 
The dependent variable "Local" which takes a value of (1) in case of local U.S target and (0) if otherwise is regressed over three 
definitions of bidder performance in addition to price run-up of bidder's stock over l-fiscal year period prior to the transaction's year, 
Market-to-Book ratio, Debt ratio, and the ratio of intangibles to total assets. 
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TABLE VI - Continued 
THE BIDDER'S CHOICE OF LOCAL (U.S) Vs. FOREIGN (NON-U.S) TARGET IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL C: Base Explanatory Including Compensation Loss Proxy and Control Variables 
Local = a + Pi PCAR_1 + fi2PCARJ2 + P3 PCAR_3 + P4 Loss_Reactionj + fisLoss_Reactwn2 + P6Loss_Reactwn3 + fi7 (Ret-RvwIND) + fi& 
NIBEX-CHG + P9 Change in Top Executive Compensation + fi\o Ret + fin MB + fin Debt/Assets + P13 Intangibles/Assets + P14 Cash Comp 
Ratio + P15 Insider Ownership + £ 
The dependent variable "Local" which takes a value of (1) in case of local U S target and (0) if otherwise is regressed over thiee 
definitions of bidder performance in addition to price run-up of bidder's stock over 1-fiscal year period prior to the transaction's year, 








(Ret - RVw IND) 
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THE BIDDER'S TARGET CHOICES OVER SUBSAMPLES CONTROLLING FOR OTHER CHOICES 
Model 1: Choice = a + pi PCAR_1 + B2 PCAR_2 + p3 PCAR_3 + B4 Loss_Reactioni + p5 Loss_Reaction2 + p6 LossJReaction3 + p7 (Ret - Rvw IND) + Ps 
NIBEX_CHG + p9 Change in Mgt Compensation + fil0Ret + Pn MB + p12 Debt/Assets + pI3 Intangibles/Assets + E 
Model 2: Choice = a + Pi PCAR_1 + p2 PCARJ2 + p3 PCAR_3 + p4 Loss_Reactionl + p5 Loss_Reactwn2 + p6 LossJReactwn^ + p7 (7?ef - RVWIND) + Ps 
NIBEX_CHG + p9 Change in Mgt Compensation + fil0Ret + p n MB + p i2 Debt/Assets + pJ3 Intangibles/Assets + p14 Cas/? Compensation Ratio + pI5 Insider 
Ownership + e 
Choice variables of Related/Unrelated and Public/Private targets are regressed using 2-models on eight (8) sub samples, namely, (1) Local-Related targets (2) 
Local-Unrelated targets (3) Local-Private targets (4) Local-Public targets (5) Foreign-Related targets (6) Foreign-Unrelated targets (7) Foreign-Private targets 
and (8) Foreign-Public targets. The control variables include price run-up of bidder's stock over 1-fiscal year period prior to the tiansaction's year, Market-to-
Book ratio, Debt ratio, the ratio of intangibles to total assets, cash compensation ratio of management team and insider ownership 
Local Targets Sample Foreign Targets Sample 
Related Sub. Unrelated Sub. Private Sub. Public Sub. Related Sub Unrelated Sub Private Sub. Public Sub. 
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NIBEX_CHG 
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THE RELATIVE SIZE OF TARGETS CHOSEN BY SERIAL BIDDERS IN M&A DEALS 
Relative Size = a + Pi PCAR_1 + fi2 PCARJ2 + p3 PCAR_3 + B4 Loss_Reactionj + fi5 LossJieaction2 + fi6 Loss_Reaction3 + p7 (Ret - RVW-IND) + fis 
Change in Top Mgt Compensation + fi9Mkt-Cap + fil0 MB + Pn Debt/Assets + fil2FCF + fiu Intangibles/Assets + p14 Insider Ownership + s 
The Relative Size of Targets to Bidders are regressed on four definitions of bidder performance in addition to six other control variables, namely, 
Bidder's Market-Cap, Market-to-Book ratio, Debt ratio, Free-Cash-Flow, the ratio of intangibles to total assets and insider ownership. 























































































































































TIME PERIOD BETWEEN DEALS AND TO CLOSE A DEAL BY SERIAL BIDDERS IN M&A DEALS 
Model (A): Time - proxy = a + Pi PCAR_1 + p2 PCARJ2 + p3 PCAR_3 + p4 Loss_Reactionj + p5 Loss_Reactwn2 + PG Loss_Reaction3 -t 
NIBEX + fi9Ret + $l0Mkt-Cap + pn MB + p]2 Debt/Assets + P,3 FCF + p14 Intangibles/Assets + p,5 Relative Size + s 
p7(y?er-/?VWwDJ + p8 
Model (B): Time - /^ roxy = a + Pi PCAR_1 + p2 PCARJ2 + p3 PCAR_3 + p4 Loss_Reactiont + p5 Loss_Reaction2 + % Loss_Reaction3 + p7 (i?ef - / ? w wcj + Ps 
Change in Mgt Compensation + fi9NIBEX + $i0Ret + Pn Mkt-Cap + Pi2 MB + p B Debt/Assets + p14 FCF + p15 Intangibles/Assets + p]6 Relative Size + p n Car/i 
Compensation Ratio + Pig Insider Ownership + e 
The above two models were used to explain two time factors related with serial bidders behavior in M&A transactions, namely, (1) Period utilized by biddeis to 
close a transaction (time between announcement till closing or withdrawal) (n) Time period lapsed between the closing of one tiansaction and the announcement 
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THE PREMIUMS PAID BY SERIAL BIDDERS IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL A: Base Model with Basic Explanatory and Control Variables 
Premium - proxy = a + fix PCAR_l + fi2 PCARJ2 + p3 PCARJ3 + fi4 Loss_Reaction1 + p5 Loss_Reaction2 + fib Loss_Reaction3 + p7 (Ret - Rvw IND) + 
fi&Ret + p9Mkt-Cap + fil0 MB + fiu Debt/Assets + fii2 FCF + fiu Intangibles/Assets + fii4 Relative Size + e 
Four proxies for Premiums paid by bidders are regressed on three definitions of bidder performance in addition to seven other control variables, 
namely, price run-up of bidder's stock over l-fiscal year period prior to the transaction's year, Bidder's Market-Cap, Market-to-Book ratio, Debt 
ratio, Free-Cash-Flow, the ratio of intangibles to total assets and relative size of bidder / target. 
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TABLE X - Continued 
THE PREMIUMS PAID BY SERIAL BIDDERS IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL B: Base Model with additional controls for compensation structure and insider ownership 
Premium - proxy = a + fi\PCAR_l + fi2PCAR_2 + fio,PCAR_3 + fi4Loss_Reactioni + fi^Loss•_Reaction2 + fi(,Loss_Reactioiii + fi1 (Ret - Rvw IND) + 
fisRet + fi9Mkt-Cap + p10 MB + fin Debt/Assets + fin Relative Size + fi\j Cash Comp. Ratio + p14 Insider Ownership + e 
Four proxies for Premiums paid by bidders are regressed on three definitions of bidder performance in addition to seven other control variables, 
namely, price run-up of bidder's stock over l-fiscal year period prior to the transaction's year, Bidder's Market-Cap, Market-to-Book ratio, Debt 
ratio, relative size of bidder / target, cash compensation ratio for top management and insider's ownership. 
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TABLE X - Continued 
THE PREMIUMS PAID BY SERIAL BIDDERS IN M&A DEALS 
PANEL C: Adjusted Model with Compensation Loss Variable 
Premium - proxy = a + Pi PCAR_1 + fi2PCARJ2 + fi3PCAR_3 + fi4Loss_Reaction, + fi5Loss_Reaction2 + fi6Loss_Reaction^ + p7 (Ret-RvwIND) + 
fi$Mgt Compensation Change + fi9MB + fiw Debt/Assets + Pn Intangibles/Assets + fi\2 Relative Size + p13 Insider Ownership + e 
Four proxies for Premiums paid by bidders are regressed on four definitions of bidder performance in addition to seven other control variables, 
namely, Market-to-Book ratio, Debt ratio, intangible assets ratio, relative size of bidder / target, and insider's ownership. 
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0 703 '* ' 
0 167 
-0 042* 
No Obs 710 707 708 2866 510 507 508 2377 438 438 436 2004 272 269 272 862 
R2 2 87% 177% 5 58% 42 08% 3 38% 4 38% 5 75% 4138% 3 93% 2 52% 7 86% 40 54% 4 30% 3 51% 4 67% 47 02% 
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TABLE XI 
PREMIUMS REGRESSIONS WITH ENDOGENEITY CORRECTION 
Three model specifications are reported to explain premiums paid by bidders for targets using a 2-stage Probit-OLS regression to correct 
of the endogenous effect of the choice variables (Public/Private, Local/Foreign and Related/Unrelated targets), the results of which are 
reported in panels A & B In addition, Panel B reports the results of a 2 stage LS regressions (2SLS) explaining premiums paid by 
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Premium Regressions with Correction for Public/Private 
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; and Local/Foreign Targets (2-Stage Probit-OLS) 
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Cash Comp Ratio 
Insider Ownership 
Related Target 
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IMPACT OF LOSS AVERSION USING MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION PROXIES ON PREMIUMS PAID BY SERIAL BIDDERS 
The below table summarize the regression results of proxies of cash and non-cash managerial compensation on premiums paid by bidders The results are 
reported for three (3) definitions for premiums (1) 1-Day Premium (n) 1-Week Premium and (m) 4-Weeks Premium. Two models aie used to explain 
premiums using either 2 proxies of cash compensation changes to the management team or non-cash compensation changes to the management team. The 
results are reported using company-level and Fama-French industry-level (median) data for control variables Results using FF-Industry medians aie 
reported in italics. 
Model (1): Premium - proxy = a + Pi Change in Cash Compensation of Top Executive + p2 Change in Cash Compensation of Other Members Of 
Management + fcRet + p4 MB + p5 Debt/Assets + p6 Intangibles/Assets + p7 Relative Size + Pg Cash Compensation Ratio + p9 Insider Ownership + s 
Model (2): Premium - proxy = a + p! Change in Non-Cash Compensation of Top Executive + p2 Change in Non-Cash Compensation of Other Members Of 
Management + fcRet + p4 MB + P5 Debt/Assets + PJ Intangibles/Assets + P7 Relative Size + Ps Cash Compensation Ratio + P9 Insider Ownership + s 
Cash Comp. Changes for Top Executive and Mgt 
Company Level Controls 
Non-Cash Comp. Changes for Top Executive and Mgt 














Company Level Contioh 
1-Day 1-Week 4-Weeks 











































FF Industry Level Controls 
1-Day 1-Week 4-Weeks 











































CHG % - Cash Comp Top Executive -5 224*** -4 56* -5 09** 
CHG % - Cash Comp of Mgt Team -10 46*** -7 67a -8 10* 
CHG % - Non Cash Comp Top Executive na na na 
CHG % - Non Cash Comp of Mgt Team na na na 
Ret (Price Run-up) -0 035* -0 037 -0 059** 
MB 1406*** 128* 3 31*** 
Debt/Assets 24 881*** 34 098*** 40 29*** 
Intangibles/Assets -4 901*** -14 58 -15 34* 
Relative Size -1507 1989 -6 86** 
Cash Comp Ratio -2 187 -7 77 -4 85 
Insidei Ownership 14 39 18 75 17 12 
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3 893 1 73 
-18 76 12 84 
10 09""* 16 09**" 
-10 06" -10 57* 
32 03 2182 







DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT (OWNERSHIP) SUBSAMPLES 
Descriptive statistics reported for managerial ownership (entrenchment) subsamples (top and bottom quartiles 
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MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT ROBUSTNESS: TESTING THE IMPACT OF INSIDER'S OWNERSHIP ON LOSS AVERSION EFFECTS 
Model (1): Dependent = a + Pi PCAR_1 + p2 PCARJ2 + p3 PCAR_3 + p4 Loss_Reactionj + p5 Loss_Reaction2 + p6 Loss_Reaction, + p7 (Ret - RVWIND) + Ps 
Change in Mgt Compensation + Pg Ret + p ] 0 MB + p n Debt/Assets + Pi2 Intangibles/Assets + s 
Model (2): Dependent = a + pi PCAR_1 + p2 PCARJ2 + p3 PCAR_3 + p4 Loss_Reactwnt + p5 Loss_Reactwn2 + p6 Loss_Reactwn^ + <37 (Ret - RVW-IND) + Ps 
Change in Mgt Compensation + fi9Ret + Pi0 MB + Pn Debt/Assets + p ! 2 Intangibles/Assets + p ) 3 Cash Compensation Ratio + p14 Relative Size + s 
The above two models are used to reproduce the choice and premium regressions results in two sub samples representing the top and bottom quai tiles of the main 
sample sorted by extent of insider's ownership. The results produced for the two sub samples reflect the impact of the extent of managerial entienchment in then 
companies on the loss aversion results in M&A deals. 
High Management Entrenchment (N=986) Low Management Entrenchment (N=985) 
Variables Public/Private Local/Foreign Related/Unrelated Premium Public/Private Local/Foreign Related/Unrelated Premium 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF OVERCONFIDENCE SUBSAMPLES 
Descriptive statistics reported for overconfidence subsamples using 3 overconfidence proxies 
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Loss Reaction 1 
(Ret - RVw IND) 























































































































































PANEL C: Top and Bottom Quartiles (sub-samples) by Log of Dollar Value of Options 





Loss Reaction 1 
(Ret - RVw IND) 






















































































































































MANAGERIAL OVERCONFIDENCE ROBUSTNESS: TESTING THE IMPACT OF OVERCONFIDENCE ON LOSS AVERSION EFFECTS 
Model (1): Dependent = a + PJ PCAR_1 + p2 PCARJ2 + p3 PCAR_3 + p4 Loss_Reactionj + p5 Loss_Reaction2 + fa Loss_Reaction^ + p7 (Ret - Rvw IND) + Ps 
Change in Mgt Compensation + $9Ret + p10 MB + Pn Debt/Assets + Pi2 Intangibles/Assets + E 
Model (2): Dependent = a + Pi PCAR_1 + p2 PCAR_2 + p3 PCAR_3 + p4 Loss_Reaction, + p5 Loss_Reaction2 + P6 Loss_Reaction3 + p7 (Ret - RVWIND) + Ps 
Change in Mgt Compensation + $9Ret + fii0 MB + Pn Debt/Assets + p[2 Intangibles/Assets + pi3 Cash Compensation Ratio + p14 Relative Size + s 
The above two models are used to reproduce the choice and premium regressions results in two sub samples representing the top and bottom quartiles of the main 
sample sorted by three (3) managerial overconfidence proxies, namely (l) number of deals conducted by bidders (n) value of m-the-money options held by 
management (in) ratio of in-the-money options held by management to company's market capitalization The results pioduced for the various sub samples leflect 
the impact of the extent of managerial overconfidence on the loss aversion results in M&A deals. 
PANEL A: Top and Bottom Quartiles of Managerial Overconfidence by Number of Deals 
Bidders with 13 Deals or More (Q4 / N=1106) Bidders with 4 Deals or Less (Ql / N=1145) 
Variables Public/Private Local/Foreign Related/Unrelated Premium Public/Private Local/Foreign Related/Unrelated Premium 






















































































































































































































































































































































TABLE XVI - Continued 







































































































































































































Value of Options Held by Management 
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TABLE XVI - Continued 
MANAGERIAL OVERCONFIDENCE ROBUSTNESS: TESTING THE IMPACT OF OVERCONFIDENCE ON LOSS AVERSION EFFECTS 
PANEL C: Top and Bottom Quartiles of Managerial Overconfidence by Ratio of Options Held by Management to Market Cap 
Q4 - Top Quartile of Options Ratio (N=1095) Ql - Bottom Quartile of Options Ratio (N=1103) 
Variables Public/Private Local/Foreign Related/Unrelated Premium Public/Private Local/Foreign Related/Unrelated Premium 























































































































































































































































































































































DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PERIODS SUBSAMPLES 
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(Ret - RVW-IND) 
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2000 (iii) 2001-2005. 











































































INDUSTRY & TIME PERIODS ROBUSTNESS: REGRESSIONS WITH INDUSTRY MEDIANS 
The robustness of loss aversion results on target choices and premium is tested ovei various time periods while using Fama-French industiy wide medians data 
points for control variables rather than company level data The results are replicated for three (3) time periods correspond to major M&A waves including (1) 
1990 - 1996 (n) 1997 - 2000 and (in) 2001 - 2005 
PANEL A: 







(Ret - Rvw IND) 
CHG-Mgt Comp 
R e t - Median 


































Ful l S a m p l e Per iod: 
Public 
-0 018 




















































- 2005 and 1990 











< 0 0161 
0 812**" 
1 114"** 0183 
0 521** 
0 074 



















































































































































0 1 4 7 * * 
0 024 





























• 1 04*"" 
n a 
n a 






































































TABLE XVIII - Continued 
INDUSTRY & TIME PERIODS ROBUSTNESS: REGRESSIONS WITH INDUSTRY MEDIANS 
The robustness of loss aversion results on target choices and premium is tested over various time periods while using Fama-French industry wide medians data 
points for control variables rather than company level data. The results are replicated for three (3) time periods correspond to major M&A waves including (1) 
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